Since achieving victory in World War II, the United States military has a less than enviable combat record in irregular warfare. This exchange provides differing perspectives on where past decisions and doctrines have led to defeat and where they may have succeeded if given more time or executed differently. This episode responds to John A. Nagl’s article, “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars,” published in the Autumn 2022 issue of Parameters (vol. 52, no. 3).
Read the review and reply here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss1/16/
Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.
Episode Transcript: Review and Reply: On “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars”
Stephanie Crider (Host)
You’re listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
I’m here with Alexander, special operations NCO, and Dr. John Nagle, author of “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars,” which was published in the Autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Welcome to Decisive Point, gentlemen.
Dr. John Nagl
It’s good to be here, Stephanie.
Alex
Thank you for having me, Stephanie.
Host
John, please give us a brief recap of your original article.
Nagl
The article argued that the United States has a somewhat acceptable record of conventional war since it became the greatest power on Earth, sometime over the course of the Second World War. Not just the greatest power on Earth but the greatest power the world has ever seen, with a power differential unknown in human history. But it does not have a similar record in irregular wars. In fact, our absolute abject defeat with helicopters off the roof of the embassy in both Vietnam and Afghanistan.
And while Iraq, arguably too soon to tell for sure, does have costs that far exceed any possible gain, I argued in the article that our record in irregular wars since we became the greatest power on Earth is 0 and 3. And I asked why that was and suggested that in the future, enemies of the United States would be very unlikely to confront us conventionally in what the Pentagon is now calling large-scale combat operations, but instead would fight us in ways where they know they have a chance of winning . . . in irregulars, wars, insurgencies, terrorism, the sort of wars that have stymied us for the last 20 years. And therefore, I argue that as the Pentagon focuses on preparing for war with China—to deter and, if necessary, to defeat China—it should spend at least a little time trying to understand why we keep losing irregular wars and more than a little time trying to make sure that we don’t lose the next one.
Host
Alex, you took issue with John’s piece. Please explain your perspective.
Alex
So, I really appreciated John’s analysis, and I absolutely agree that we definitely need to start with why and seek understanding in that. Where I disagreed the most was with his conclusion that if a country is important enough to fight over, it is important enough to stay for generations. I think there are some conditions on that—the most important being that a cultural climate must first be gauged in order to assess how successful or worthwhile a commitment will be. The duration of the commitment really doesn’t matter because if the cultural climate will not support a country’s efforts in war, that country is wasting its time unless it’s willing to colonize whoever it’s fighting.
It’s like trying to grow coffee in Alaska. Unless the climate in Alaska changes to support coffee growth, you’ll never be able to grow coffee there. Afghanistan was and is entrenched in tribalism and never fully developed into an industrialized nation state. Added to that, it is a culture that is generally hostile to anything originating from non-Muslim Western societies. So how long would be long enough to overcome those two deeply ingrained cultural dimensions to produce the functioning nation state that so many hope to achieve? I personally believe that there is no length of time that would have been sufficient to produce a fully functioning, self-sustaining democratic nation state with a strong national identity. Because the current cultural climate will not support it.
Host
Your thoughts John?
Nagl
I’m not sure I disagree with anything Alex said. And I’d like to congratulate him on his eloquence and on the coffee in Alaska analogy, which is absolutely terrific. I think the root of our disagreement focuses on Afghanistan, where I know Alex has spent some time, and I spent a little time. My argument is that the Afghanistan case is very similar to the Vietnam case. That by the end of American involvement in both of those wars, we had achieved what is, broadly speaking, the best outcome we can hope for when fighting a protracted irregular war—that is a country that still is deeply troubled. It’s only deeply troubled countries that face protracted insurgencies. Those countries that have terrific government, where the population all gets along tend not to have those sorts of things. In countries like Afghanistan and Vietnam, the best you can hope for is a government that has a foreign policy that is, broadly speaking, in accordance with the interests of the United States (US is the intervening state) that is developing its own security forces and can with a relatively small number, (some thousands of American advisers, supported by American air power), can keep the threat at Bay.
My argument is that that’s what the United States achieved in Vietnam, and it’s also what we achieved in Afghanistan. And I think we should be prepared if we’re going to fight a counterinsurgency campaign in a country to understand that we’re going to have American troops there, not for a generation as we did in Vietnam and Afghanistan, but for generations. And I can understand that people can disagree with that assessment. World War Two was . . . coming up on 80 years ago. And we still, four generations ago, and we still have American troops in Germany, Italy, and Japan. And will, in my estimation, for at least a century to come.
And second, those troops are . . . they’re at some risk, of course. But in the 15 months prior to the American departure from Afghanistan, when, of course, we lost 13 in a horrific incident, we had lost no American soldiers. And I believe that the benefit of maintaining a government in Afghanistan that is in US interests, precluding the Taliban from regaining power, maintaining control of Bagram air base (an absolutely invaluable lilypad in a very dangerous part of the world), and perhaps most importantly, preventing the radical Islamic extremists (who still threaten us and our interests around the globe) from having what analyst Peter Bergen called their best day since September 11th, the day that the Afghan government fell. I think that’s worth keeping a couple thousand American troops and a couple billion dollars in American aid flowing to the Afghan government, to infinity and beyond.
Host
Final thoughts before we go, Alex?
Alex
It’s interesting you brought up World War II, John, because I’ve definitely spent some time thinking about, well, what set apart nations like Japan and Germany from countries like Vietnam and Afghanistan? And I still come back to the cultural aspect, which in many strategic analyses is overlooked. Both Japan and Germany had a more organized nation state that was willing to accept defeat and allow the victor, I suppose, to rebuild a nation that was already a fully industrialized nation state. So, it’s just the cultural mindset in Afghanistan and Vietnam was totally different.
And it’s interesting to me that Vietnam became a communist country, and yet it’s a very different flavor from China today. And, in many ways, it is politically somewhat hostile to China’s actions. So it’s curious that Vietnam didn’t quite turn out the way that the domino effect might otherwise have indicated it would.
Nagl
Terrific points, Alex. I appreciate your strategic empathy and your appreciation for different cultures. Japan and Germany were, of course, pretty completely destroyed by the end of the Second World War. Fortunately, in neither Vietnam nor Afghanistan did the wars have that sort of immediate impact on society, although they did over time in both countries. I think, in particular, in Vietnam, I would argue, as a result of our misguided counterinsurgency strategy.
And so, I think the question is, for political decisionmakers, because both Vietnam and Afghanistan—those pullout decisions—what are you hoping to achieve? And if what you’re hoping to achieve is a country that looks like the United States, you’re obviously never going to get there. But if you believe that America has security interests in the region, which I very strongly feel it does in both Southeast Asia and in the Hindu Kush, then it may well be worth . . . I believe it strongly is worth . . . keeping a couple thousand American troops supported by air power there indefinitely.
And Alex is certainly right that history is an unusual thing that the future is unknowable. That it takes twists and turns, and that Vietnam is now closer to the United States than anyone could have predicted almost 50 years ago when that horrible war came to an end. Nonetheless, the suffering that happened in between in Vietnam and Cambodia with the Khmer Rouge and here in the United States in the aftermath of a lost war, which as Alex noted, may be one of the reasons why the United States turned away from irregular war, sort of subcontracted that out to our special operating forces.
I think that damage could have been avoided. More lives could have been saved, and Vietnam could be wealthier and safer, and a closer US ally now had we made some different choices, and, in particular, had we lowered our expectations and done a really hard calculation about our national interests. So I hope as we go forward that politicians will first understand that wars aren’t going to go the way they think they’re going to. They’re going to be longer and more costly, both for us and for the enemies we confront. And also, achieving an end state—a successful end state—in those wars is likely to require a multi-generational commitment of American troops as it has in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Korea.
Host
I think we have time, Alex, if you want to reply. And then last word to John.
Alex
I’ll reply. Thank you. I do agree with what John said about lowering the expectations or adjusting the expectations of what is it exactly that you hope to achieve and is that too grandiose of an expectation, given the culture? I suppose my main thrust with my points is that culture in the larger calculus seems to be largely ignored, and it should be given much more weight than it currently does.
Nagl
I agree with that. I was the Minerva Research professor at the US Naval Academy for a couple of years. Secretary Gates appointed me to that position in order to try to increase our understanding of cultures and societies in the wars that we were fighting then, when I was serving in that role about a decade ago. And I’m continuing to advocate for that kind of understanding today.
And I’d just like to close by thanking Alex for reading my stuff. You’re the one. I’d always hoped I’d meet somebody who would. And then engaging with me, both in writing and now in words, in a very thoughtful way that, hopefully, will help our army and our nation make better national security choices for many years to come. And I’d like to close by thanking him for his service. As a fat, old, retired guy, it’s men like you who keep us safe and able to get fatter. And I’d like to close by pointing out that round is, in fact, a shape.
Host
What a treat to talk with you both today. Thank you for your contribution to Parameters, and thank you for your time. Listeners read the review and reply in its entirety at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 53, issue 1.
If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform.
About the authors: Dr. John A. Nagl is an associate professor of warfighting studies in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. He is the author of Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice (Penguin Books, 2014).
Alex is a special operations NCO.
| Date Taken: | 03.13.2023 |
| Date Posted: | 06.20.2023 16:28 |
| Category: | Newscasts |
| Audio ID: | 74965 |
| Filename: | 2306/DOD_109718441.mp3 |
| Length: | 00:11:40 |
| Artist | US Army War College Press |
| Album | Decisive Point Podcast – Season 4 |
| Track # | 04 |
| Year | 2023 |
| Genre | Podcast |
| Location: | US |
| Web Views: | 18 |
| Downloads: | 2 |
| High-Res. Downloads: | 2 |
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