Engineer Tactics to Shape Theater Operations

Photo By Shaina Marie ONeal | Width of Coral Path Beneath Grass  

GUAM

12.01.2021

Courtesy Story

Joint Region Marianas

Story by Maj. Rachael Nussbaum, USAF

Last Minute Construction

Every one of us has had the experience of waiting until the last minute before starting work on an academic assignment, and some of us have had that experience when the assignment in question is a group project. We all know that the resulting product is less that our best effort, and if we walk away with a passing score, we were lucky, grading was on a curve, and the other groups started even later than us. I argue that the Joint view of the phases of war used to develop most OPLANs, from the perspective of the Engineer community, forces us into the paradigm of starting the group project the night before it is due. And I propose an alternative.

The Operational Paradigm

The Joint view of the phases of war, shown in the below graphic from War on the Rocks, illustrates that very little is done before a crisis occurs and an OPORD is activated. An adversary can intentionally work in phase 0 without triggering any notable activity or movement among US conventional tactical units. This problem is well known and well analyzed in many articles and documents. In the Pacific theater, one way that the combatant commander historically sought to shape the theater is with the discontinued ‘Continuous Bomber Presence’. The presence of tactical bomber units was expensive, and had questionable results on the operations of adversaries in the region. China continued to fly sorties around (Scharre, 2016) Taiwan, imposed treaty-breaking conditions in Hong Kong, put Uyghurs in camps, and claimed a form of Lebensraum in the South China Sea. North Korea continued to develop nuclear weapons, longer range, faster, and more accurate missiles, and conducted assassinations outside of its borders. Russia linked up with and deepened alliances with both, as well as leveraging little green men to change the strategic picture in the European theater and rivaling North Korea in the assassination game.

In short, a Continuous Bomber Presence may have not had much impact on the strategic goals and operational activities of adversary nations, because they understood how to operate below the level at which such a kinetic tactical force would be used against them. In addition, the continuous bomber presence began in 2004; and on review of the US military readiness to prosecute a war in, and the socio-politico-military shape of the Pacific Theater, there is no clear gain that the bomber presence generated. Therefore, operational assets don’t work well to shape a theater and change the trajectory of adversary actions. It appears the value of ‘presence’ by kinetic tactical forces is to delay major escalation, and thereby create space for shaping, but they do not inherently shape a theater. Achieving that operational effect will require some other use of, or different type of tactical forces.

Human International Political Nature

A primary question is whether war in the theater is inevitable, or if an ongoing delay of escalation is sufficient to effectively prevent it. The Thucydides Trap claims that the major escalation from competition to conflict is a strong rule of human nature in international affairs, and in sixteen recent examples, twelve resulted in war (Allison, 2015). Rarely has a nation gained parity with, or surpassed an existing power without war. At those points where peaceful transition happened it resulted from unique circumstances. In the referenced article, Allison claims four times when war did not result between powers – the US over Great Britain – which occurred around the same time both fought the Nazis; and resulted in GB losing Imperial control of much of the world to be replaced with a commonwealth. The Soviets by the Japanese in the 1980s – when the US would have fought on Japan’s side and the Soviet strategic calculus would include a strong rnisk of escalation into the European theater and overall loss. The US being challenged by the Soviets – which was encapsulated in a cold war, violently fought in multiple proxy wars, and very much modulated by all the allied NATO and Warsaw powers which did not want to be caught in the middle of a nuclear exchange. Lastly Allison includes the shift of power in Europe as Germany reclaimed a major role after reunification, which occurred in the shadow of the US domination of NATO. Allison does not reach further back into history when China was the most dominant power, and lost that position to European Powers, or the history of the American civilizations prior to Columbus and the result of that meeting of what were then near-peers. Considering the pre-Colombian civilizations suffered perhaps 80-95% death as a result of disease (Nunn & Qian, 2010), and the transition from near-peer native cultures to western dominance was still not peaceful, that example supports Thucydides’ infallibility. With respect to China, strategic missteps such as destroying Zheng He’s blue-water navy, a belief in itself as singularly blessed by heaven, and rejection of foreign ties and influence, meant China gave space for Europe to rise. That choice did not work out well for China, as the European Powers shortly became colonial, introduced opium, disrupted and gained control of the Chinese Imperial Court, and China suffered effective conquest and degradation for well over a century. Indeed, only recently did China begin reclaiming significant international power, which fuels the modern Chinese perspective. As this article has now established the Chinese perspective on the world, the general rule of the Thucydides Trap, and the useful but incomplete effect of tactical assets to shape a theater toward operational readiness, all that is left is to identify a potential Engineer role for the Air Force CE community to fulfill.

Engineered Effects

Construction takes time – while bombers can arrive in theater to airbases in a matter of hours; the creation of airbases is a matter of years. And construction is a clear signal in the informational space that a nation is committed – while bombers and operational forces can leave the theater in a matter of days to hours, the construction of any base is a semi-permanent non-fungible investment. Operational assets are limited, in that they can only work in areas suited to their operations, such as an existing airfield, but engineers are flexible, in that given either time or resources, and ideally both, any location can become an operational location. However, construction can be quite difficult in remote and isolated locations, which is why RED HORSE and PRIME BEEF were created during the Vietnam era. Our predecessors could not find the construction assets they needed in the local South Pacific economies and remote regions that were needed to support the operations of the Vietnam War, so they created construction units with that capability as tactical units within the Air Force. The missing half to the continuous bomber presence was and still is a continuous Air Force Engineer presence.

A continuous AF Engineer presence is a variable-cost option that absolutely can shape a theater and generate readiness; a team of 5 engineers conducting surveys and drawing up planning maps for a site while living there is extremely low cost; especially if self-sustaining in field conditions with MREs and a small set of BEAR assets; tents, generator, HVAC, etc. A larger team of 15 is still extremely low cost, and capable of useful effects. For example 15 3E2s tasked to clear, grub, excavate and compact a site for a future apron can easily complete that in a couple months, as well as quite a bit more depending on the equipment provided. An ongoing engineer presence also means should international affairs rapidly degrade, and Thuycidides make his appearance, the apron is ready in days instead of weeks, and engineers are on-site and available for RFIs to support the creation and execution of all contracts and troop deployments needed to shift the airfield from ‘engineer presence site’ to ‘ongoing air operations’. The Chief of Staff has challenged us to ‘operate differently’, to ‘accelerate change or lose’. I propose that within the Air Force Civil Engineer community, we meet this challenge by choosing to establish rotational forces sent to locations identified by combatant commanders as critical for distributed air operations.

Given the constraints on in-house Engineer financial resources, these will necessarily be small teams, self-sustaining in field conditions, tasked with small but ongoing improvements to areas and maintenance of existing assets. Consider the multiple MILCONs to build or restore a runway, warehouses, aprons, and facilities at a cost of hundreds of millions at any one of the identified critical locations, which already are spread across multiple FYDPs. I recommend we do not depend on that process, and use the alternatives that are within our Civil Engineer community’s control. Within existing resources, we can sustain indefinitely a small number of teams of 10-15 Engineers on two or three month rotations, and allow them to use the skills they have acquired to change future theater operations. As they do that, their presence is a clear signal to adversaries and allies of US commitment to the theater, while being small enough to not trigger immediate escalation.

Analogous Views

Another way of viewing such an ongoing presence is to think of them in a manner similar to interest on a savings account. A 0% interest rate means inflation is losing you purchasing power – no continuous engineer presence means that facilities do exist are degrading, illustrated by this image of a WWII era taxiway on Peleliu as documented by a recent Marine survey as part of an ongoing Marine presence in the islands (more reports and images available in REDi). A small interest rate can be sized to keep up with inflation – keeping the brush and grass from growing on top of the still-there hardtop, maybe repairing spalls. A slightly larger interest rate will serve to gain purchasing power rather than keep pace with inflation – comparable to an ongoing engineer presence large enough to keep the jungle off of the airfield, while making clear and continual site improvements over several short tours.

For example a 3E2-focused tour could pour slabs for a cantonment area and the footings for a PEB over two months; a follow-on rotation heavy in 3E4 and 3E0 would run utility lines; and a 3E3 heavy rotation would put up the structures; all would simultaneously keep the airfield clear of encroaching jungle. Over three tours and six months, we would have a small cantonment area and warehouse ready to use, while sustaining the cost of roughly 10-15 airmen in field conditions. With a fiscally sustainable, materially effective, and most critically, a continuous engineer presence at key locations in the theater, we will have changed the way we operate – meeting the CSAF’s challenge to ‘Accelerate Change or Lose’ and our actions would directly and advantageously change the shape of the coming Thucydidian conflict.

Necessary details

There are two questions left, the best size of the continuous engineer presence and the best test bed location and unit. The continual engineer presence needed to achieve what I have described as an interest rate equal to the inflation rate will vary with the size of the airfield and LSA established. While I estimate it to be well below 10 airmen, I recommend refinement be made by examining the sum of recurring work for an airfield, logistics squadron’s facilities, and 50-person’s worth of dorm at a comparably sized hot-climate base – anything beyond those facilities is likely more than needed for this purpose. Adding even one Airman to the team required for that recurring work, and we are actively shaping the theater in support of the combatant commander. To return to the original premise of this article, and viewing the execution of a combat operation as an academic group project; in the Pacific, there isn’t a curve and the other group has been working on their project for decades. Instead of allowing ourselves to stay in the paradigm of starting the night before and hoping what we can produce fits the assignment well enough to outdo the other group and thereby ‘pass’; in establishing a continuous engineer presence, we begin chip away at the project in small bits from now until the due date. And from experience, that always results in a better product.
To test this concept, I recommend we start a rotation every two months with ten airmen from 554th RHS tasked to the airfield on Tinian. The Navy on Guam can transport them and selected equipment 120 miles north – making this a joint exercise, and reducing the costs of the experiment by leveraging Naval capabilities rather than expending funds on tickets. After a year we will have spent about $80k for the TDY personnel plus costs for Class IV and POL used and the BEAR assets employed. We can examine the results; comparing refined cost data and the teams’ actual production against the estimated contract costs for the Tinian airfield. Should the teams’ efforts prove clearly beneficial to theater shaping as well as reasonably fiscally responsible, we can resource and expand the program. With Joint Region Marianas conducting proper pol/mil preparation and coordination with the nations of the South Pacific, and funding resources from the USINDOPACOM commander, each RHS could be tasked to establish a continuous engineer presence at a critical distributed air operations location in the South Pacific. If the effort is successful enough and the Air Force chooses to make the strategic investment needed, then larger Prime Beef units can be tasked, and incorporate even more critical distributed operations locations.

Conclusion

The Chief of Staff has challenged us to ‘accelerate change or lose’. We cannot accelerate the MILCON process or generate an increase in minor construction beyond the limits Congress has and will impose. We can sustain indefinitely some number of small-team continuous presence TDYs. We can leverage our tactical engineer units, with their expeditionary construction training and skills, and according to their historical purposes and origin, to signal our commitment in the Pacific theater and accelerate the facility readiness of bases and installations for future full spectrum war operations, when –not if – they occur.

Works Cited

Allison, G. (2015, 09 25). The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China headed for war. Retrieved from The Atlantic: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/
Nunn, N., & Qian, N. (2010). The Colombian Exchange: A History of Disease, Food, and Ideas. Journal of economic Perspectives, 163-188.
Scharre, P. (2016, 10 6). American Strategy and the Six Phases of Grief. Retrieved from War on the Rocks: https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/american-strategy-and-the-six-phases-of-grief/

Maj Rachael Nussbaum, USAF

Major Nussbaum (BS, USAFA; MA, American Military University, MA University of Leicester) is the J4 Infrastructure Planning Coordinator, Joint Region Marianas, Guam. She works to coordinate the efforts of all services in Guam, the CNMI, the FSM, and Palau, as well as other areas as tasked by HHQ. Her previous joint experience was writing OPLANS and executing the major theater training event as the Engineer Plans and Operations Officer for the USFK subunified command. Her command tour was the 821st Support Squadron at Thule Air Base, Greenland, where her squadron provided civil engineering, communications, airfield operations, deep-water seaport operations, logistics, the base hospital, and force support to the northernmost US installation. Prior to command, she was the program element monitor for 22 programs, totaling 5 percent of the USAF Total Obligation Authority. As a captain, she was the flight commander for the Explosive Ordnance Disposal flight at Seymour Johnson AFB, South Carolina, and Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom, and deployed flights in Kuwait and Qatar. She also served as the programming chief at Lajes AB, Portugal, and served a tour as director, US National Support Element, Pápa AB, Hungary. As a lieutenant, she stood up the Asset Management Flight at Kunsan AB, South Korea, and was the maintenance engineer at Yokota AB, Japan. Major Nussbaum grew up reading the works of Pratchett, Bujold, Asimov, L.E. Modesitt Jr, Heinlein, and Clarke, among many others, and would like to close with Yeats, “Do not wait to strike till the iron is hot: but make it hot by striking”.

• Date Taken: 12.01.2021
• Date Posted: 12.02.2021 22:41
• Story ID: 410372
• Location: GU