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    Wisconsin G-2 helps rectify over-optimism

    Wisconsin G-2 helps rectify over-optimism

    Courtesy Photo | Maj. Paul B. Clemens (left) and Lt. William J. Niedprune questioning a German officer....... read more read more

    FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA, UNITED STATES

    08.01.2022

    Courtesy Story

    U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

    by Michael E. Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian

    On August 1, 1918, doughboys of Maj. Gen. William Haan’s 32d Division secured Hill 230, key terrain north of the Ourcq River. An important aspect of this victory was Maj. Paul B. Clemens’ intelligence work to counter overly optimistic estimates of the enemy.

    The 36-year-old Clemens was a longtime Wisconsin National Guardsman. Enlisting in the National Guard in 1901, he quickly rose through the ranks and was a captain in 1910. He saw active service along the Mexican Border in 1916. After the Wisconsin and Michigan Guards were brought into federal service in July 1917, he worked to reorganize his brigade into logistic units for the newly formed 32d Division. Impressed, General Haan brought the major to the division staff as the G-2. Before shipping off to France, the new G-2 was able to attend a nine-day-course given by Col. Ralph Van Deman, the head of the War Department’s Military Intelligence Section. Once in France, Clemens toured British and French units in the trenches. Finally, from March to May 1918, he graduated with distinction from the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) Staff College at Langres, France.

    In June, Clemens rejoined his division in the quiet Alsace sector, where he could put his training into practical application. He quickly cemented his reputation as a capable officer and administrator. This esteem, however, proved a disadvantage for the division when it moved to the active Aisne-Marne region in mid-July. Lt. Col. Robert Beck, the divisional G-3, assigned Clemens the vital task of coordinating the division’s billets in the combat zone. While performing this onerous task, the G-2 had no time to properly liaise with the sector’s French and American intelligence officers. By the time Clemens resumed his G-2 duties full-time, the 32d Division was poised to attack.

    As part of the French 38th Corps, the division was to attack from the Ourcq River toward the Vesle River, about twelve miles to the north-northeast. Without their G-2’s estimate of the enemy, General Haan and his commanders relied heavily on the French assessment: the German were demoralized and were soon withdrawing to the Vesle. To the French, Haan’s doughboys just needed to push and the Germans would collapse. Unfortunately, this impression led to hasty, costly, and generally unsuccessful assaults on stiff German defenses. By the second day of the attack, the division was stymied in front of a ridgeline dominated by Hill 230.

    To the rear, Major Clemens closely tracked the battle reports in a Le Charmel barn. From his perspective, his division was not facing a demoralized foe. From spot reports dotting on his maps, Clemens could see the enemy was not moving north in any great hurry. The G-2 garnered support from 1st Lt. William J. Niedprune, a German-linguist from Detroit. On 31 July, the two Americans interrogated prisoners to learn if the Germans intended to fight along their current lines or move north. All the prisoners spoke of their orders to fight doggedly along the current line. In his next intelligence summary, Clemens offered a more sober and realistic assessment: the Germans would offer strong resistance south of the Vesle.

    One of the spectators of Niedprune’s interrogations was Lt. Col. Glenn Garlock, the executive officer with the 128th Infantry. His regiment had the responsibility to attack Hill 230 next. Knowing the Germans would not retreat at a simple show of strength, Garlock carefully conducted a leader’s reconnaissance on the morning of 1 August. On the hill’s east side, he found an open flank and gained permission to attack through an adjacent French division’s sector. Then he and his fellow regimental leaders coordinated a two-prong attack against the hill from the flanks. By nightfall, the division had dislodged the German defenders. Without the Hill 230 defenses, the German were now forced back to the Vesle River.

    Careful planning based on good reconnaissance and a realistic appreciation of German intentions proved a powerful combination for General Haan and his doughboys. Over the next three days, the division quickly advanced the twelve miles to the Vesle, doing its part to reduce the Marne salient.

    NEWS INFO

    Date Taken: 08.01.2022
    Date Posted: 08.01.2022 12:44
    Story ID: 426246
    Location: FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA, US

    Web Views: 24
    Downloads: 0

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