The Battle of the Coral Sea
By Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Nick Boris
The first aircraft carrier battle of the World War II took
place in the Coral Sea in the south Pacific on between May
4-8 1942. The outcome was critical in stopping Japanese
momentum in the region, prevented the isolation of Australia,
and played a key role in the outcome of the Battle of Midway
in June 1942.
The day before, Rear Adm. Frank J. Fletcher, commander
of Task Force 17, then at, sea west of the main Allied base
of Noumea, received intelligence reports from Commander,
Southern Pacific Forces that a Japanese detachment was
headed for Tulagi Harbor in the Solomon Islands.
“This was just the kind of report we had been waiting
two months to receive,” said Fletcher.
On the morning of May 4, Yorktown (CV-5) launched
the first of three strikes by Torpedo Squadron Five, Bombing
Squadron Five, and Scouting Squadron Five, the first of
which consisted of a dozen Douglas (TBD) Devastator
torpedo bombers and 28 Douglas (SBD) Dauntless dive
bombers. Owing to the presence of Japanese Mitsubishi
F1M2 floatplane fighters discovered at Tulagi, Grumman
(F4F) Wildcat fighters accompanied the second and
third strikes.
Over the course of the day these attacks sank
destroyer Kikuzuki, minesweeper Tama Maru, and auxiliary
minesweepers Wa 1 and Wa 2. While another four ships
were damaged and four floatplanes destroyed, the attack
did not prevent the establishment of a seaplane base there.
After recovering aircraft, TF 17 turned south for rendezvous
with TF 11 and TF 44, arriving there the morning of May 5.
The attack on Tulagi, while productive, alerted Vice
Adm. Takagi in the Japanese Carrier Strike Force, comprised
of carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku, two cruisers, and six
destroyers, to the presence of American carriers in the area.
Takagi, then far to the north of Tulagi, steamed south at
speed and began search efforts from a position just south
of the Solomon Islands.
Fletcher, meanwhile, was informed by radio message
from Pearl Harbor that the Japanese Port Moresby strike
force was at sea. After combining his two carrier forces
into TF 17, the Allied ships spent the rest of May 6 refueling,
intending to steam west and do battle against the Port
Moresby invasion force the next day.
On the morning of May 7, the U.S. side, also at 8:15 am, a
scout plane spotted part of the Port Moresby force far to the
northwest. Owing to a radio coding error by the scout plane’s
pilot, the message came through as ‘two enemy carriers and
four cruisers.’ By 10:13 am, a strike force was on its way too.
It was an ironic moment, with both sides incorrectly thinking
they had found the main enemy carrier force.
At 9:15 am, the Japanese strike spotted Neosho and
Sims, and then spent the next hour and a half vainly searching
for Fletcher’s carriers, which were further west. At 11:15 am
the fighters and torpedo bombers abandoned the search and
returned to their carriers while 36 dive bombers attacked the
two USN ships. The outcome was never in doubt and Sims
was sunk after three bomb hits and Neosho, hit with seven
bombs, was heavily damaged and later scuttled.
In turn, the U.S. strike force spotted the Japanese
covering force of light carrier Shoho and four cruisers at
10:40 am. Attacking first, Lexington’s air group attacked first,
scoring two 1,000-pound bomb hits, and up to five torpedo
hits, severely damaging the Japanese carrier.
“After the Lexington planes departed, the enemy carrier
ceased maneuvering and turned into the wind,” said Capt.
Elliot Buckmaster, commanding officer USS Yorktown. “A
perfect target.”
Yorktown’s Scouting Squadron Five and Bombing
Squadron Five made their dives from 18,000 feet and the
combined attacks by 24 SBDs scored at least 11 more
bomb hits. With Shoho now listing to starboard and on fire,
Torpedo Squadron Five delivered the final blows with at
least two more torpedoes hits, quickly sinking the carrier
at 11:35 am that morning. This marked the first Japanese
carrier sunk during the war, a feat memorialized by squadron
commander Robert E. Dixon’s radio message “Scratch one
flat top!” Later rescue efforts would only save 203 men
out of the carriers 834-man crew and all 18 of its aircraft
were lost.
The primary concern that afternoon was finding the
main enemy, as both sides now knew opposing fleet carriers
were within range. Fletcher, concluding it would be too late
to attack after recovering strike aircraft that afternoon,
withdrew southwest to remain under heavy cloud cover. In
contrast, Takagi, having received a report of Allied ships
southeast of New Guinea, launched a small strike of 27
dive bombers and torpedo planes even though he knew
they would not return until after dark. Unluckily for them,
the strike was picked up on radar and TF 17 vectored 11
Wildcat fighter to intercept. Taken by surprise, and without
fighter protection, the American pilots shot down seven
torpedo bombers and two dive bombers at a cost of three
Wildcats lost.
That night both sides feverishly prepared for battle
the next day, with ordnance and plane mechanics working
through the night as pilots got a few hours of sleep.
Unfortunately for the U.S. carriers, the warm frontal zone
that had shielded them all day with low cloud cover shifted
north and east, now covering Takagi’s force. Early in the
morning of May 8, both sides launched search aircraft and
awaited the inevitable reports.
At 8:20 am, a Lexington SBD pilot, Lt.j.g. Joseph Smith,
reported both Japanese carriers through a gap in the clouds.
Two minutes later, a Shokaku search plane commanded by
Warrant Officer Kenzo Kanno, spotted Fletcher’s two carriers.
The two forces were about 240 miles apart and both sides
almost simultaneously raced to launch strike aircraft.
Because of lost and damaged planes from the day
before, the Japanese managed to launch a combined strike
of 18 fighters, 33 dive bombers, and 18 torpedo planes at 9:15
am. The U.S. carriers each launched separate strikes, which
was common practice, with Yorktown’s group comprising 6
fighters, 24 dive bombers, and 9 torpedo planes away at 9:15
am and Lexington’s group of 9 fighters, 15 dive bombers,
and 12 torpedo planes off at 9:25 am.
Arriving over the Japanese carriers at 10:32 am,
Yorktown’s attack group of 39 aircraft focused on carrier
Shokaku, as Zuikaku was partially hidden under a rain squall.
The Japanese carrier, maneuvering radically at high speed,
proved a difficult target. The torpedo planes did not make any
hits and only two dive bombers scored 1,000-pound bomb
hits, the second of which was scored by Lt. j.g. John Powers,
assigned to Bombing Squadron Five (VB-5). Determined to
successfully drop his ordnance on Shokaku’s flight deck he
pressed his dive far lower than normal, releasing his bomb at
only 200-feet. The resulting explosion knocked Lt.j.g Powers’
aircraft into the ocean. President Roosevelt would later
recognize his heroism and devotion to duty by awarding him
a Medal of Honor posthumously. During this wave a total
of two U.S. dive bombers and two Japanese fighters were
shot down.
Lexington’s air group arrived in packets around 11:30
am, scoring a third 1,000-bomb hit after two dive bombers
attacked Shokaku. The torpedo bombers conducted 11
attacks as well, all of which missed. Two other dives
bombers failed to score hits on Zuikaku and the rest failed to
find the Japanese carriers in the heavy clouds. These strikes
were protected by 9 U.S. fighters, of which three were lost.
These two strikes did enough damage to Shokaku, however.
With 223 crew killed and her flight deck heavily damaged
the carrier retired to the northeast, leaving Zuikaku alone to
continue the battle.
Meanwhile, at 10:55 am, Lexington’s radar picked up
the incoming Japanese strike of 69 aircraft. Nine Wildcats
on combat air patrol were vectored to intercept, as were 23
patrolling SBD’s, focusing on the first wave of 18 Japanese
torpedo bombers. Unfortunately, most of the Wildcats were
out of position as they expected the torpedo bombers
at much lower altitude, and only four enemy aircraft were
shot down as they approached. Lt. William Hall, flying an
SBD out of Scouting Squadron Two, distinguished himself
in attacking three of those Japanese aircraft and, although
badly wounded, safely lands his aircraft back to his ship.
Hall’s bravery and skill on this day, as well as the day before
when he scored a hit on Shoho, are later awarded with the
Medal of Honor.
While four of the attacking planes failed to score hits
on Yorktown, the other ten maneuvered to launch an anvil
or pincer attack on Lexington, with some attacking from
the bow and the rest from the port side. Despite dramatic
maneuvering by Capt. Sherman, his carrier was struck by
two Type 91 torpedoes. The first damaged aviation gasoline
storage tanks, which released gasoline vapor into the
surrounding compartments, and the second destroyed the
port water main, shutting down the three forward fire and
boiler rooms. Despite this damage, Lexington was still able
to make 24 knots.
The 33 Japanese dive bombers attacked minutes later,
with 19 lining up on Lexington and 14 targeting Yorktown.
Each of the American carriers took damage, with Lexington
suffering two bomb hits and several near misses while
Yorktown took a single 550-pound semi-armor piercing bomb
hit in the center of her flight deck. The bomb penetrated four
decks before exploding, killing or wounding 66 sailors, and
knocking out her boilers. Another 12 near misses damaged
her hull below the waterline. One of the wounded sailors
was Lt. Milton E. Ricketts, in charge of an engineering repair
party, whose entire team was killed in the explosion. Facing
a raging fire, the mortally wounded Ricketts opened a valve
on a nearby fire plug, pulled out a hose, and directed water
into the compartment below before he dropped dead on the
deck. For his extraordinary heroism he was awarded the
Medal of Honor posthumously.
During these attacks, four Japanese torpedo planes
were shot down by anti-aircraft fire and another three
torpedo bombers, one dive bomber, and one fighter were lost
in aerial duels. The U.S. lost three SBDs and three Wildcats
in return. Later, as the strike groups flew home, they passed
each other in the air, more Japanese dive bombers were
shot down. During recovery operations, both sides lost more
aircraft to damage or crashes, with the U.S. losing eight and
the Japanese another 20 aircraft.
Fletcher, receiving reports of heavy fighter losses, with
both his carriers damaged, and low on fuel – the loss of
Neosho was telling – ordered TF 17 to withdraw. At the same
time, Takagi, with only 36 operational aircraft left, decided he
could not protect his own ships nor the invasion fleet, and
ordered both groups to Rabaul, abandoning plans to invade
Port Moresby.
There remained one final drama to play out that day,
caused by the gasoline vapor leak deep inside Lexington.
Despite damage control team efforts, which had put out
fires and fixed water mains, sparks from an electric motor
set off a huge explosion at 12:47 pm that killed 25 men.
Cmdr. Seligman, then executive officer, was blown through a
scuttle hatch by the blast only moments after checking with
damage control teams and suspecting everything was under
control. Damage control teams fought the firs for almost
three hours, but two other explosions shook the ship at 2:42
pm and 3:25 pm repectfully.
At that time, wrote Cmdr, Seligman, “The forward part of
the ship was ablaze” and “Both above and below the armored
deck with absolutely no means left to fight the fire.” At 3:38
pm the crew reported the fires were uncontrollable. “… from
this time on the ship was doomed,” said Capt. Sherman,
and he ordered abandon ship at 5:07 pm. Over the next two
hours, USS Morris (DD417), USS Anderson (DD-411), USS
Hammann (DD-412), USS Phelps (DD-360), USS Minneapolis
(CA-36) and USS Dewey (DD-349) rescued 2,735 men from
life rafts and the water. At 6:52 pm, Phelps was ordered to
sink the burning Lexington, which it did at 7:15 pm with a
salvo of five torpedoes,
The Battle of the Coral Sea is the first engagement in
naval history in which opposing warships did not exchange
gunfire; all damage was inflicted by naval aircraft. The
outcome, though operationally a draw – each side lost
one carrier – was a strategic victory for the U.S. Navy. Not
only was the Japanese push southward blunted, but heavy
losses to Japanese air groups as well as ship damage
meant neither Zuikaku or Shokaku coud participate in the
upcoming Midway operation. At the same time, the Japanese
erroneously believed Yorktown was also sunk and went into
the Midway operation overly confident of victory.
Date Taken: | 05.09.2022 |
Date Posted: | 12.28.2022 11:13 |
Story ID: | 435967 |
Location: | FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND, US |
Hometown: | FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND, US |
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