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by John DellaGiustina, MI Corps Association (MICA)
On 19 March 2003, CWO4 Henry Crowder, the Oil Infrastructure Team lead in the Term Fusion Cell of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) C-2 Joint Analytic Control Element (JACE), identified Iraqi forces preparing facilities in the southern Rumaila oil fields for destruction. Based on his intelligence assessment, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, General Tommy Franks, made the decision to start ground operations the next day, twenty-four hours before the air component launched their strategic air campaign. The CFLCC C-2 continued to provide timely intelligence support throughout the campaign.
On 17 March 2003, Iraq’s failure to comply with United Nations (UN) mandates regarding their chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs led President George W. Bush to inform Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein that he and his sons had forty-eight hours to depart the country. When they failed to do so, the war commenced at 2100 hours on 19 March with strategic strikes and special operations force insertions.
Commanded by Lt. Gen. David McKienan, the CFLCC Headquarters stood up in late 2002 to plan for operations if Iraq did not comply with the UN mandates. Maj. Gen. James “Spider” Marks, the CFLCC C-2, and his deputy, Col. Steve Rotkoff, ably led an intelligence staff of 440 soldiers and civilians at Camp Doha, Kuwait. The staff incorporated the Army Central Command G-2, elements of the 513th MI Brigade, individual augmentees, national agency attachments, and joint service, interagency, and coalition liaisons. During the planning phase, the C-2 JACE created detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products that drove war gaming and numerous combined arms rehearsals. Baghdad Effects Support Packages delineated critical facilities, infrastructure, and Republican Guard divisions in and around the key terrain of the capital. Additionally, intelligence analysts at CFLCC, V Corps, and I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) integrated the same mapping tool to develop a Common Intelligence Picture providing situational awareness and identifying dynamic targeting priorities across a battlespace the size of California.
On the morning of 19 March, CWO4 Crowder analyzed imagery taken of Rumaila the previous night and noted normal oil flow and burn-off flames had been replaced with dummy flares. He knew this was abnormal as his team’s IPB products had been meticulously documenting and monitoring Iraq’s oil facilities. Additional unmanned aerial vehicle motion imagery showed six wells spouting flames high into the air. Based on the C-2 intelligence assessment, General Franks ordered the ground war to begin earlier than anticipated to prevent the massive oil fires seen at the end of Operation DESERT STORM. On the evening of 20 March, Maj. Gen. James Mattis’ 1st Marine Division, I MEF, crossed the berm between Kuwait and Iraq and quickly seized the oil fields. Maneuver elements of the British 1st Armoured Division then secured the oil complex enroute to their tactical objectives. Simultaneously, the 3d Infantry Division of U.S. Army V Corps began their drive toward Baghdad, 350 miles to the north.
During the ensuing combat operations, the 350-member strong JACE operated 24/7. Its Battle Captains developed a running estimate of enemy activity that drove the daily CFLCC Battle Update Assessment (BUA), providing informed recommendations to help shape the future battlefield. The CFLCC C-2 continually coordinated with the CENTCOM J-2 and the air and special operations components. More important was the analytic collaboration with the V Corps and I MEF G-2s. For example, V Corps G-2 Col. Steve Boltz saw the JACE as a seamless extension of his own analytic effort. He set his analytic priority to targeting because he knew the C-2 could support his situational awareness needs.
After V Corps established their tactical operations center in Baghdad in mid-April, General Franks reportedly asked Colonel Boltz (who had been his G-2 at 2d Infantry Division, Korea, in 1995-1996), “why did intel do so much better this time?” Colonel Boltz responded, “we prepared for months, studied the enemy in detail, worked with and understood each other across the IBOS [Intelligence Battlefield Operating System], and built the systems needed.” As the hub of the ground campaign’s IBOS, the CFLCC C-2’s effective intelligence support to V Corps, I MEF, and Coalition partners was integral to the rapid defeat of the world’s sixth-largest Army in twenty-two days.
An expanded version of this article will appear in the upcoming edition of MICA’s journal The Vanguard at https://www.mica-national.org
| Date Taken: | 03.22.2023 |
| Date Posted: | 03.22.2023 10:59 |
| Story ID: | 440918 |
| Location: | IQ |
| Web Views: | 309 |
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