McCloy Board Reorganizes the Army G-2

Photo By Erin Thompson | John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War.  

UNITED STATES

04.24.2023

Courtesy Story

U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

by Mike E. Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian

24 APRIL 1944
On 24 April 1944, the Army G-2 issued “MID Report on Reorganization” that laid out its last major restructuring of World War II. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy and his board’s recommendations provided the basis of the report.

By early 1944, the G-2 had become a large, but muddled staff. Although the G-2 had political and economic sections, it was largely organized along geographical lines. Moreover, other sections focused on a specific source of information, such as signals intelligence and military attachés. “Organizationally,” one observer noted, “G-2 was a mongrel with many uncertain strains mixed in and not always recognizable.”

To correct this, McCloy pulled together a board of officers in February 1944. A 49-year-old lawyer with a knack for national security issues, McCloy had been with the War Department since April 1941. His board included three general officers, including Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, the new G-2 designee. [See This Week in MI History #172 7 February 1944] For the next month or so, the committee examined existing procedures, especially the flow of information.

McCloy’s board considered grinding out intelligence comparable to the publication of a large newspaper or news magazine. Consequently, some of the officers visited The New York Times and Time magazine to look at their organizations and procedures. Brig. Gen. Otto Nelson, one of those officers, claimed “valuable suggestions resulted” from these visits and they “played a part in determining some of the recommended changes.” Afterwards, the board assembled its proposal for final review.

The 24 April report announced the approval of these proposals. Moreover, it outlined the guiding principles behind them. Of primary importance, the reorganization sought to separate the intelligence analysts “from the annoyances and details of administration.” It also aimed to tailor the G-2 to emphasize German and Japanese intelligence, eliminating activities which did not meet the war’s needs. Along the same lines, the board wanted “to curb the flow of useless military information and to emphasize quality in lieu of quantity.” Finally, the board’s organization sought to end the compartmentation that had characterized the G-2’s previous procedures.

To achieve its primary objective, the McCloy reorganization isolated the G-2 analysts from policy and administrative functions. The G-2’s general staff and policy functions fell to a small group of staff officers who reported directly to the G-2. This group had no responsibility for the production of intelligence. Instead, that duty fell to an overhauled Military Intelligence Service (MIS).

Like the G-2 policy staff, the MIS also fell directly under the G-2. The service had the responsibility to convert incoming information into usable intelligence for the Army’s senior leaders and theater commanders. Accounting for about 85 percent of the G-2’s overall strength, the MIS had three directorates: Information, Administration, and Intelligence. The director of information secured the necessary information and distributed it within the MIS, while the administrative director took care of the service’s logistical and personnel burdens. Thus, the director of intelligence could concentrate on the intelligence production.

Within the intelligence directorate, the McCloy Board relied on “the Specialists,” or senior analysts, to produce meaningful intelligence that anticipated future events. To make best use of their expertise, the Specialists were not to become involved in minutiae. Instead, a supporting group of research analysts compiled basic data as well as engaged in research projects to directly assist the senior analysts. Upon completion of the Specialists’ reports, an editorial group would format, edit, and produce all the intelligence reports and publications.

In its effort to streamline the G-2 organization and improve its intelligence products, the McCloy Board created an organization that attempted to isolate its senior analysts from vexing administrative housekeeping, policy issues, and even compilation of simple intelligence data. It was not perfect and required further tinkering. Still, the reorganization improved the manner in which material was handled and better focused its analysts to produce meaningful intelligence.

----
"This Week in Military Intelligence" publishes new issues each Friday. To report story errors, ask questions, or be added to our distribution list, please contact [e-mail].

• Date Taken: 04.24.2023
• Date Posted: 04.24.2023 10:49
• Story ID: 443218
• Location: US