"Combat Intelligence" Published

Photo By Erin Thompson | Front cover of "Combat Intelligence" (1936)  

UNITED STATES

05.01.2023

Courtesy Story

U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

by Mike E. Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian

In 1936, "Infantry Journal" published Maj. Edwin E. Schwien’s "Combat Intelligence: Its Acquisition and Transmission." The book was one of the Army’s first treatises to consider the need for systematic intelligence work at the battalion level. It strongly argued for the need of an intelligence service school.

The 42-year-old Schwien had fought with the American 3d Division in World War I. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions as a company commander in the Meuse-Argonne. After the war, he graduated from the prestigious École Supérieure de Guerre in France. Then, from 1932-1936, he taught at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. It was during his Leavenworth service that he wrote "Combat Intelligence."

His purpose in writing the book was to demystify the work of the intelligence officer. “Since the War,” he noted, “probably no other section of the general staff has been so much of a mystery to the average officer as the second, or intelligence section.” He went on to argue that tactical commanders needed information on the enemy’s capabilities to decide on a proper scheme of maneuver. Without that information, Schwien argued “war will be reduced to the level of pure gambling.” Consequently, he set out to show “the absolute necessity for a logical systematic search for essential information, a deliberate, dispassionate evaluation of this information and the prompt dissemination of the resulting intelligence.”

The first part of Schwien’s book is a discussion of the connection between intelligence and the commander’s concept of maneuver. He stated such a concept should consider four factors: Mission, Own Capabilities, Enemy Capabilities, and Terrain. In considering the enemy’s capabilities, the commander and his staff must treat the enemy as “a live, vital factor.” This can only be done by looking at the enemy’s capabilities. Schwien believed trying to determine enemy intentions was dangerous, since indications of what an enemy has in mind can be misleading.

In the second and longest part of his book, Schwien laid out the nuts and bolts of how to collect, interpret, and disseminate information on the enemy. Throughout these chapters, he argued for a methodical approach in collection planning, coordinating with the rest of the staff, and evaluation of information.

Finally, Schwien gave two case studies that applied his precepts to the battalion level. In the first, “A Less Expensive Procedure,” he markedly used the example of the 3d Division’s combat in the Meuse-Argonne (that resulted in his DSC) as what not to do!

Although the book was relative short with only 125 pages, it was supported by eighteen large pullout out maps so a reader could more easily follow Schwien’s points. Each of his ideas were supported by a specific historical example, usually from the French experiences during World War I. No doubt he gleaned these from his attendance at the French war college in 1932.

In "Combat Intelligence," Schwien forcefully argued intelligence work required well-qualified staff officers, “preferably captains with considerable experience” who were trained in the specific intelligence procedures. In fact, at the end of his book, he called for the establishment of “an intelligence service school…where specially selected junior officers can be given a three- or four-month course in this vital work.” “Only in this way,” Schwien argued, “we will be able to avoid the bitter and costly experiences of our assault battalions in the last war.”

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• Date Taken: 05.01.2023
• Date Posted: 05.01.2023 11:17
• Story ID: 443724
• Location: US