Photo By Erin Thompson | In the early morning of 4 June 1989, armed troops from the Chinese People’s...... read more read more
Subscribe
by Erin E. Thompson, USAICoE Staff Historian
(Continued from last week)
4 JUNE 1989
In the early morning of 4 June 1989, armed troops from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) marched on Tiananmen Square to end pro-democracy demonstrations. The resulting violence ended with civilian deaths estimated between 300–2,000, with more than 6,000 injured.
The tipping point occurred on 1 June 1989, when a People’s Armed Police (PAP) vehicle accidentally swerved into a crowd of civilians, killing three cyclists. The next day, an unarmed column of troops attempted to enter Beijing near the site of the accident but were forcefully stopped by mourners. Finally, on 3 June, the PLA and PAP were authorized to use deadly force to enter and secure the square by dawn the next day. Around one a.m. on 4 June 1989, PLA troops converged on the square from all directions.
Contrary to common assumptions, most deaths did not occur in Tiananmen Square but on surrounding roads. Near the scene of the 1 June accident, several hundred civilians were killed by units pushing through the crowds with bayonets. Tanks moving east on Chang’an Avenue were quickly set on fire by protesters who then turned their sights on fleeing PLA troops.
Intelligence officers from the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) observed activity in and around Beijing that day and estimated that about one hundred died in the square itself. Brig. Gen. Jack Leide, Maj. Larry Wortzel, and other military attachés who witnessed the events were able to collect intelligence by knowing Beijing’s geography and communication lines; understanding the PLA’s strategies, assembly areas, and combat readiness and capabilities; and cultivating human intelligence (HUMINT) from a variety of sources within the local population. These actions were significantly hindered by increased Chinese Communist Party (CCP) security and suppression while the protests grew in scale and intensity. According to General Leide, “The DAO’s efforts exemplified the value of the collection and use of human intelligence in its purest form.”
By dawn on 4 June, injured and deceased civilians and soldiers and smoldering rubble of military vehicles littered the streets. Some sporadic incidents against civilians occurred between 4-7 June, including firing on U.S. embassy personnel and dependents, but most of the violence occurred between midnight and six a.m. on 4 June. The CCP held that approximately 300 civilians and soldiers died. However, the DAO believed those killed numbered between 1,000-1,500, with several thousand more injured.
The DAO received commendations from the Department of Defense and the director of Central Intelligence for their efforts on the ground and in keeping American officials apprised of the situation. Ambassador Lilley noted that “the Defense Attaché’s Office in Beijing under General Leide’s leadership put in a superb performance” during the crisis. Following the 4 June incident, the ambassador tasked the DAO with the evacuation of Americans from China. The office also revived an $800,000,000 security assistance program with the PLA.
Larry Wortzel continued serving as assistant military attaché through 1990 and senior Army attaché from 1995–1997, and he became the director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College from 1997–1999, retiring as a colonel to become director of the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation and later vice president for foreign policy and defense studies. Today, he is considered one of America’s leading experts on Chinese military strategy. Jack Leide became the J-2 of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in 1990 and director of intelligence during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. He later was the first director of the Defense HUMINT Service. He retired from the Army in 1995 as a major general and was later inducted into the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame, the Attaché Hall of Fame, and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Torch Bearers Hall of Fame.
-- Thank you to Maj. Gen. Jack Leide (USA, retired) and Col. Larry Wortzel (USA, retired) for their contributions to this article. For further reading on the topic, please see Larry Wortzel’s “The Tiananmen Massacre Reappraised: Public Protest, Urban Warfare, and the People’s Liberation Army,” (Strategic Studies Institute, 2005) and James Lilley’s “China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia,” (Public Affairs, 2004). --
----
"This Week in MI History" publishes new issues every week. To report story errors, ask questions, or be added to our distribution list, please contact: TR-ICoE-Command-Historian@army.mil.
| Date Taken: | 06.05.2023 |
| Date Posted: | 06.05.2023 10:47 |
| Story ID: | 446220 |
| Location: | US |
| Web Views: | 1,303 |
| Downloads: | 0 |
This work, Military Attachés Witness Tiananmen Massacre (4 June 1989), by Erin Thompson, identified by DVIDS, must comply with the restrictions shown on https://www.dvidshub.net/about/copyright.
No keywords found.
