Landings in Southern France (15 AUG 1944)

Photo By Erin Thompson | On 15 August 1944, three American divisions from Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch’s U.S. Seventh Army landed on the southern coast of France as part of Operation DRAGOON. Since early March, Col. William W. Quinn, Patch’s G-2, had developed a remarkably accurate picture of the enemy along the Mediterranean coast.  

UNITED STATES

08.14.2023

Courtesy Story

U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

by Michael E. Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian

15 AUGUST 1944
On 15 August 1944, three American divisions from Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch’s U.S. Seventh Army landed on the southern coast of France as part of Operation DRAGOON. Since early March, Col. William W. Quinn, Patch’s G-2, had developed a remarkably accurate picture of the enemy along the Mediterranean coast.

In December 1943, the theater headquarters directed the Seventh Army, then under Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, to begin planning for an operation like the July invasion of Sicily. Just after Christmas, Patton’s planners learned their objective was southern France in support of the upcoming Normandy invasion.

In mid-January, Patton established a planning group under Brig. Gen. Garrison Davidson in Algiers, Algeria. Known as Force 163, it began working on a concept for a two-to-three-division landing near the port of Toulon, France. Yet, competing strategies as well as a dynamic operational situation led to ever changing assumptions and planning factors. For example, on 23 January, theater headquarters asked for a plan for a three-division landing. Yet, the very next day, that was changed to a single division.

Shortly after the single-division order arrived, Patton left for the United Kingdom with several key members of his staff, including Col. Oscar Koch, his highly effective G-2. For a month, Force 163 labored without a commander to make decisions and obtain guidance from higher headquarters. On 2 March, General Patch took command of the Seventh Army. With him came a new set of staff heads, including the 37-year-old Quinn as the G-2.

At this point, Davidson could brief his new commander that Operation ANVIL, the landing’s codename, had been tentatively scheduled in conjunction with the Normandy invasion. It would invade southern France, pin enemy forces, and secure a Mediterranean port. The operational concept, however, lacked a clear directive from theater headquarters, a definite troop list, and listing of departure ports.

In mid-April, as General Patch pressed for authoritative guidance, he received word ANVIL would not be launched before late July. “The misfortune of Operation ANVIL,” a Seventh Army report noted, “was simply that its hopes and prospects fell in the long shadows cast by the bitter Italian campaign on the one side and the anxious preparations for OVERLORD in Normandy on the other.” Instead of planning for a deliberate operation with a specific mission, Patch’s staff was now tasked to prepare general contingency plans if enemy forces surrendered or evacuated southern France. During the late spring, conflicting priorities and operational conditions continued to plague Patch and his planners.

Finally, nine days after the D-Day landings on Normandy, British leaders reluctantly agreed to the assignment of a corps headquarters and five divisions as ANVIL forces. On 23 June, General Dwight D. Eisenhower recommended these forces land in southern France by the end of August, preferably 15 August. With dedicated forces and an established date, Seventh Army planners could begin the required detailed planning. For security reasons, the operation’s name was changed to DRAGOON. Largely because of the preliminary planning accomplished in the first six months of 1944, Patch’s staff completed the final plans with almost no confusion or delay.

Perhaps no staff section benefitted more from the long planning cycle than Colonel Quinn’s G-2. In late April, he had briefed a comprehensive estimate of German capability, plans, and order of battle. From that starting point, he used the next three months to track the continuous movement of German units coming into the area to recover from fighting on other fronts. The lengthy planning also allowed him to launch a prodigious all-source collection effort. So, as G-3 and G-4 planners struggled with available forces and supplies, those from Colonel Quinn’s G-2 could concentrate on developing an accurate layout of the composition and disposition of the nine German divisions along the Mediterranean coast.

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• Date Taken: 08.14.2023
• Date Posted: 08.14.2023 11:03
• Story ID: 451314
• Location: US