by Erin E. Thompson, USAICoE Staff Historian
3 OCTOBER 1950
On 3 October 1950, the U.S. State Department forwarded a warning to the Department of the Army from Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai. In it, he threatened Chinese military involvement in North Korea should United Nations (UN) forces cross the 38th parallel. The Chinese Communist Force (CCF) invaded North Korea later that month, launching a series of deadly attacks against U.S. military forces from November–December.
American intelligence organizations were aware of communist China’s relationship with North Korea and the Soviet Union after World War II. However, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Maj. Gen. A.R. Bolling became especially interested in the nation’s activities after General Douglas MacArthur’s successful landing at Incheon in mid-September 1950. [See "This Week in MI History" #57 15 September 1950] By that time, increased political tensions between China and UN-affiliated nations prevented the Army from gaining valuable intelligence about China’s willingness to send troops to aid North Korea. To boost these intelligence efforts, the U.S. State Department reached an agreement with India’s ambassador to Beijing, Dr. Sardar K.M. Panikkar, to serve as a go-between for information regarding China’s readiness to enter the conflict.
On 25 September, Ambassador Panikkar reported to General Bolling that it appeared “Communist China herself will not intervene in the conflict.” This was contrary to the State Department and the Army’s beliefs about China’s intentions, as they had known since mid-summer the Chinese were amassing supplies along the border. Just two days later, U.S. and South Korean (ROK) forces captured Seoul, pushing North Korean forces back across the 38th parallel. According to Panikkar, the rhetoric of Chinese President Mao Zedong and Zhou regarding the war drastically changed after the seizure of the South Korean capital.
On 3 October 1950, the State Department received official confirmation from Zhou, via Ambassador Panikkar, that the CCF would provide support to the North Korean Army should UN Forces cross the 38th parallel. However, by the time this memo reached the Army, units from the ROK Army and U.S. 2d Infantry Division had already crossed the border between North and South Korea. [See This Week in MI History #63 18 October 1950] Over the next week, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) would learn more about the CCF preparations for invasion, though the isolation of communication from China and North Korea made it difficult to determine the exact probability of a complete CCF invasion. On 9 October, the JCS finally submitted instructions to units moving towards the 38th parallel:
"Hereafter in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory."
This memo was not received by General MacArthur before the 1st Cavalry Division pushed across the 38th parallel on the morning of 9 October. Prisoner interrogations in the weeks following the UN Force’s advance across the 38th parallel proved the CCF began deploying between 260,000–300,000 troops into North Korea as early as 13–14 October. Despite all its efforts, Army intelligence was unable to gather conclusive evidence of the scale of the Chinese intervention, leading to disastrous consequences when the Army met the CCF head-on in November 1950.
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Date Taken: | 10.02.2023 |
Date Posted: | 10.02.2023 16:59 |
Story ID: | 454943 |
Location: | US |
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