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    893d Tank Destroyer Battalion in the Hürtgen Forest (31 OCT-4 NOV 1944)

    893d Tank Destroyer Battalion in the Hürtgen Forest (31 OCT-4 NOV 1944)

    Photo By Erin Thompson | Officers and enlisted men of the 893d TD Battalion's reconnaissance company.... read more read more

    UNITED STATES

    10.27.2023

    Courtesy Story

    U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

    by Michael E. Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian

    31 OCTOBER - 4 NOVEMBER 1944
    On 31 October 1944, Lt. Col. Samuel E. Mays’ 893d Tank Destroyer (TD) Battalion entered the forbidding Hürtgen Forest, along the Belgium-German border. Over the next four days, Capt. William E. Nash, the S-2, and Capt. Sidney C. Cole, the reconnaissance company commander, worked together to provide situational awareness to their commander.

    When his battalion deployed into the forest, Colonel Mays, a 39-year-old infantryman, had been in command for more than four years. Since landing in Normandy in early July 1944, his tank destroyers had supported several infantry divisions advancing through northeast France. In late October, Mays received orders to support the 28th Infantry Division as it pushed towards the Roer River southeast of Aachen.

    Moving into the Hürtgen Forest, Mays and his troops faced heavily wooded and rugged terrain. The pine forest was so dense Maj. John Lavin, the battalion S-3, noted “even in broad daylight only a trickle of sunlight filtered through.” The dense forest limited the battalion to a few narrow, muddy forest roads or logging trails. These trails were often mined, and a single disabled vehicle could block a whole column. Consequently, not only did Mays need information on the size and direction of potential enemy tank attacks, but he required routes to maneuver his battalion. Fortunately, Captains Cole and Nash used vigorous reconnaissance and astute situation development to supply just that information.

    Initially, the battalion supported the division’s attack with indirect fire. With the bulk of the battalion located about five and a half miles to the rear, Captain Cole, a 25-year-old Illinoisan, sent his company’s jeeps and armored cars dashing through the woods to reconnoiter the limited road network. His scouts also coordinated with the engineers manning roadblocks along trails in the northern sector of the division area. Moreover, they contemplated the most likely routes of enemy tank approach and searched for positions to counter such moves.

    While Cole’s men scouted, Captain Nash, a 30-year-old architect from Texas, used aerial photographs and maps to analyze the avenues into the divisional area. Nash also carefully watched for the whereabouts of enemy tanks, using information coming in from higher headquarters as well as Cole’s reports. Initially, he found the immediate area free of enemy armor. Nevertheless, the battalion began to plan for their primary mission of anti-tank defense.

    On 1 November, while his tank destroyers’ guns added their firepower to the division’s artillery, Colonel Mays and his staff created tentative plans based on Nash’s and Cole’s information. Plan A covered the possible enemy tank attacks from the north, while Plan B blocked the routes from the east and south. Initially, Mays, Lavin, and Nash considered an enemy tank attack from the north the most likely. Mays talked to Cole’s officers before drawing up the final plans. Upon the divisional approval, company commanders received their orders and operational codes.

    On the morning of 2 November, Maj. Gen. Norman Cota’s 28th Infantry Division began its attack towards the towns of Vossenack and Schmidt. As the infantry-tank teams moved forward, Colonel Mays planned to relocate his companies nearer to the action. That afternoon, Nash received the first reports of enemy tanks, about three miles to the northeast. With that, Cole rushed some scouts back north to the engineer roadblocks. Although the engineers had skirmished with the enemy, Cole’s men determined they could hold.

    The next day, the battalion began to move forward. They followed Cole’s carefully reconnoitered routes, arriving at tentative positions selected by his platoons. From these positions, Mays could execute either of his plans. The next morning, Nash received reports of fourteen enemy tanks about three miles to the east and, within an hour, the battalion received orders to repel a tank attack. To do that, Cole sent one of his platoons to investigate routes to the east and north of the battalion. Cole, himself, made a night patrol to reconnoiter the infamous Kall Trail into Kommerscheidt about three miles to the southeast. These patrols reported both on trafficability for both friendly and enemy forces. They provided vital information to Colonel Mays and allowed him to be poised for the next part of their battle in the Hürtgen.

    Over the next five days, the battalion engaged in the hard-fought battle for Schmidt, destroying seventeen German tanks. Nash’s assessments and Cole’s reconnaissance had allowed Colonel Mays to make the best decisions to support the infantrymen.

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    NEWS INFO

    Date Taken: 10.27.2023
    Date Posted: 10.27.2023 15:11
    Story ID: 456700
    Location: US

    Web Views: 227
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