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    Intelligence Officers Appointed on Mexican Border (3 MAR 1914)

    Intelligence Officers Appointed on Mexican Border (3 MAR 1914)

    Photo By Erin Thompson | US soldiers on the Mexican border during the Mexican Revolution (DeGolyer Library,...... read more read more

    by Lori S. Stewart, USAICoE Command Historian

    INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS APPOINTED ON MEXICAN BORDER
    On 3 March 1914, Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood issued an order directing units stationed along the U.S.-Mexican border to appoint intelligence officers. These officers were to collect any militarily useful information about the ongoing Mexican Revolution for use in preparing for a possible military intervention.

    The Mexican border had been problematic since the Mexican-American War concluded in 1848 with the United States acquiring from Mexico much of the American West, including what became the states of New Mexico, Arizona, Texas and California. Cessation of the war did not mean the end of conflict, however, and the U.S. Army would play a role in quelling discontent on the border and preventing battling factions in Mexico from spilling over to American soil for decades to come.

    Hostile conditions along the border spiked during the Mexican Revolution from 1910 to 1917. The conflict began when Porfirio Díaz, the Mexican president since 1877, rigged his own re-election, leading the followers of his opponent, Francisco Madero, to rebel. Forced to resign in 1911, Díaz was replaced by Madero, who served as president until his murder in February 1913 during a military coup by Gen. Victoriano Huerta. Huerta’s rule was then challenged by revolutionary factions led by Venustiano Carranza, Francisco “Pancho” Villa, and Emiliano Zapata. Widespread violence followed, particularly in Mexico’s northern states.

    In the United States, President Woodrow Wilson, inaugurated just a month after Huerta’s coup, resisted efforts by the American ambassador in Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, to recognize Huerta’s government. Believing information available through diplomatic channels and most newspapers was biased and inaccurate, Wilson sought more information about conditions in Mexico from his own sources: trusted reporters, customs collectors, businessmen, and friends along the border. While he complained about the lack of good intelligence, Wilson drew a clear delineation between diplomatic decision making and military operations. Consequently, he did little to acquire or inquire about available military intelligence, of which little actually existed.

    The U.S. Army had forces stationed along the border because of long simmering tensions and the divided loyalties of the Anglo American and Mexican American citizens. In March 1911, then President William Taft sent nearly 30,000 troops to the border to conduct maneuvers, but most were withdrawn by that summer. When Madero’s murder triggered a resurgence in violence, an Army division was mobilized to man the scattered posts and outposts to ensure the warring factions stayed on the Mexican side of the 2,000-mile-long border. American troops could not cross the border unless intentionally fired upon.

    Early in 1914, Col. John Biddle, an officer in the War College Division, under which the Army’s nearly defunct Military Information Committee operated [see "This Week in MI History" #140 24 June 1908], forwarded a proposal to General Wood. Believing war with Mexico inevitable, Biddle recommended a select number of men in the Army’s Southern Department be designated intelligence officers to collect militarily significant information for war planning purposes. Wood approved Biddle’s recommendation. On 3 March 1914, he directed all units stationed along the Mexican border to appoint carefully selected officers to collect “such information as is possible from refugees and other sources.” About the same time, the War College Division threw another $1,000 into the $10,000 intelligence budget and assigned one officer, soon augmented by an additional four, to gather military information already available about America’s southern neighbor.

    These were little victories for the Army’s flailing military intelligence effort, but the actions contributed little to America’s response to the Mexican Revolution. The War College’s ad hoc committee found little more than maps and published travel guides. The intelligence officers on the southern border found their collection efforts limited by the prohibition of crossing the border. Furthermore, within little more than a month, most of these officers found themselves participating in the ill-advised American occupation of Veracruz. Still, the effort foreshadowed more significant changes to come on the eve of America’s involvement in the Great War in Europe.


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    NEWS INFO

    Date Taken: 03.01.2024
    Date Posted: 03.01.2024 14:40
    Story ID: 465130
    Location: US

    Web Views: 78
    Downloads: 0

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