The U.S. Sea Services are a vital force in maintaining order and ensuring freedom of navigation in the contested waters of the West Philippine Sea, the place of unfolding strategic power struggles. The top leaders of the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard stated in the U.S. Tri-Service Maritime Strategy that we “must maintain clear-eyed resolve to compete with, deter, and, if necessary, defeat our adversaries while we accelerate development of a modernized, integrated all-domain [maritime] force for the future.”
As China’s assertive maritime claims defy international norms, their presence underscores a renewed focus on preserving a competitive edge in a region that is crucial for global security and commerce. The escalating tensions demand a sophisticated approach to upholding international law and deterring aggression, reflecting the dynamic nature of modern geopolitical conflicts.
China has recently intensified its aggressive tactics near the Philippines, from detaining foreign vessels to colliding with Philippine ships in disputed areas. As part of his response, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. created the National Maritime Council in March to strengthen the nation’s maritime security. He took the step amid “a range of serious challenges that threaten not only the country’s territorial integrity, but also the peaceful existence of Filipinos.”
According to analysts, these increased operations by China also serve as Beijing’s attempt to gauge the United States’ commitment to supporting allies in the Indo-Pacific region. The tensions are so high that in August, Washington responded to the collision between Chinese and Philippine coast guard ships, reminding Beijing of the U.S.'s 73-year-old Mutual Defense Treaty with its oldest Asian ally. In the September readout of a call between the Defense heads of the Philippines and the U.S., the Pentagon stressed “the historic momentum” in defense ties between the two countries. The balance of power in the West Philippine Sea now depends on more than just traditional military strength—it requires innovative approaches and technologies to deter illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive (ICAD) activities and maintain strategic superiority in complex, gray-zone conflicts.
In this geopolitical landscape, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard continue to develop new models for organizing, training, and equipping nautical warriors. The current environment sheds light on the clear need to focus on Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFCs). These advanced technologies bridge the gap between mere presence and lethal force which are essential for navigating the modern maritime environment.
The Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office (JIFCO) is currently working to enable U.S. and allied forces to deliver accurate, tailorable, and compelling effects in complex and ambiguous scenarios while preventing unnecessary loss of life or destruction of property by enhancing the ability of our sea service personnel to operate effectively below the level of armed conflict.
Employing IFCs in the West Philippine Sea: Enhancing U.S. Options
Let’s consider three maritime scenarios that could potentially emerge in the West Philippine Sea where IFCs may more effectively address the conceptual challenge of supporting maritime operations across the competition continuum.
Scenario One:
A high-speed waterborne craft is evading detection in the disputed waters of the West Philippine Sea. Tactically, these boats are nearly impossible to interdict, and primary options for commanders typically are restricted to firing warning shots in attempts to compel these boats to stop. Whether these vessels are operated by smugglers or intelligence collectors, they are skilled at exploiting U.S. Sea Services’ hesitance to apply any lethal force. In a scenario where a speed boat would be largely responsible for any type of harmful activity, which could range from intelligence collection to violation of a UN resolution, any lethal weapons engagement is not an acceptable option, assuming the vessel did not immediately demonstrate hostile intent to justify use of lethal force. Other than to temporarily track and report these violating speedboats, U.S. naval forces in the West Philippine Sea can currently do little else. Only with demonstrated hostile intent could U.S. Sea Services be authorized to fire lethal rounds from small caliber weapons to defend themselves.
By using Alternative IFC technologies, a Commander could effectively stop the speed boats without the risk of deadly force or permanent damage to the vessel. For example, the Vessel Incapacitating Power Effect Radiation (VIPER) system can disable engines and prevent boats from approaching by emitting microwave energy that disrupts the vessels electronic system. Beyond Directed Energy, vessel stopping technologies encompass a range of innovative solutions designed to immobilize, repel or redirect boats. These tools enhance the Sea Services’ ability to respond to threats while safeguarding service members and minimizing risks to non-combatants in maritime settings.
Scenario Two:
Consider the risks the boarding team would face when confronting the mission described in Scenario One. During Visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) operations, which are among the most routine missions throughout the Sea Services, one of the most common tactics used by a Coast Guard/Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) to disable a small boat is to shoot the engine of a small boat to disable its outboard motors. This tactic has its own set of challenges, as the LEDET search must happen quickly, given that a small boat captain could easily sabotage their space and cause the boat and cargo to quickly sink. The LEDET must also be careful during boarding operations to not inadvertently cause any explosion or fire while subduing attackers.
Previously, the LEDET did not possess any option other than their small caliber arms or pyrotechnic grenades to distract and subdue any hiding persons prior to safely apprehending them. These pyrotechnic grenades must detonate their propellants chemically to generate the desired flash, bang, and pressure wave effect. This involves risks of igniting any volatile vapors or fuels in the compartment causing an explosion or fire, destroying the evidence and the boat, as well as injuring any persons onboard.
The utilization of the IFC Non-Pyrotechnic Flash-Bang Grenade (NPFBG) mitigates these hazards by replacing non-pyrotechnically generated equivalent effects of “flash, bang, and pressure wave” to avoid the chemical combustion and ignition risks. Using a combination of pneumatic, piezo-electric, and mechanical means, an NPFBG delivers the desired “distract and suppress” response of the traditional flash-bang grenade without risk of explosions or fire, unlike traditional pyrotechnics.
Scenario Three:
IFCs can be useful beyond VBSS Operations in the West Philippine Sea. Against small boat swarm attacks in both littoral and blue waters from Chinese vessels, Directed Energy (DE) Vessel Stopping Capabilities like VIPER could prove effective. VIPER uses high power microwaves (HPM) to electronically stop the engines of the hostile boat in its path, which could also be used to neutralize swarm tactics.
This DE Vessel Stopping
This DE Vessel Stopping method greatly simplifies the targeting dilemma of a “one against multiple” targeting scenario. Its electronic “magazine” continually replenishes as long as the ship is generating electrical power; in contrast a conventional naval gun—even if it were to achieve a 100% kill rate for all rounds fired—will still likely empty its magazines well before all small fast attack craft in the swarm are successfully engaged.
The Path Ahead: Building and Reinforcing Cooperation with Regional Partners
The JIFCO is currently working with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to incorporate these a multitude of IFCs into upcoming military exercises. Experimenting and potentially fielding these systems to regional partners such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and other Pacific allies should be considered as part of the broader strategic development of tactical options in the West Philippine Sea.
The JIFCO also continues to work on IFC capabilities to enable the Sea Services to better operate between peaceful day-to-day presence and full-scale violent conflict, in the West Philippine Sea or anywhere. To develop IFCs for widespread use, the process of planning, as reflected in wargaming, modeling, and simulation, will be absolutely essential to shape strategic and operational knowledge of how systems can be procured and fielded. This engagement is critical for IFCs because the widely utilized U.S. government procurement cycle of planning, programming, budgeting and execution drives the sustainability of DoD programs. Without the essential simulations, modeling, and wargaming work, many IFCs may never be seen outside of research labs, thus rendering the research operationally ineffective and strategically wasteful.
“By developing new intermediate force capabilities (IFCs)—scalable armaments that can deliver effects short of lethal force—we can increase our options for responding to provocations and coercion in both competition and crisis,” concludes Advantage at Sea, the service strategy for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard.
| Date Taken: | 10.01.2024 |
| Date Posted: | 10.01.2024 12:47 |
| Story ID: | 482222 |
| Location: | US |
| Web Views: | 256 |
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