[This article was first published in Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin, which was then called Army Logistician, volume 2, number 1 (January–February 1970), pages 4–7, 22–23.]
THERE IS AN ARMY LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE in the making. The LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE, in its broadest sense, is an Army-wide program designed to reemphasize logistics principles, update and refine techniques, revise systems, and more clearly define training and career management objectives.
In addition, the LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE is geared to support the broad objectives of General William C. Westmoreland's four M's—Mission, Motivation, Modernization, and Management.
General Creighton Abrams used the term LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE at Phu Bai, Vietnam, last Spring to describe what was required across the entire Army logistics system in Vietnam. He meant it as a compliment for the progressive improvement made in all areas of logistics. But in reality, he was issuing a resounding challenge to all professional Army logisticians when he, as the leading combat commander in the field, applied the term "offensive" to a military logistics operation. General Westmoreland, in the name of all Americans, both soldiers and taxpayers, is also demanding "efficiency in logistics operations."
Thus, the Army is launching a logistics program to meet this challenge, using the term General Abrams coined. We, as professional Army logisticians, must muster all of the good things we have learned over the last decade, especially those that have been tried and found true, and with the same dispatch that a combat commander associates with an "offense," we must reach intermediate and final objectives with deliberate haste. To do less will mean that we have missed our opportunity and have failed to meet the challenge.
Many segments of the logistics offensive program are familiar ones. Many have been the subject of studies and tests, and some fine experience has been gained through the utilization of the majority of them. The important thing to remember, however, is that the Army is going to explore all possibilities applicable to the program. Any new segment developed for this program must be one of offense, not defense. I do want to emphasize that the logistics offensive program is going to move at a highly accelerated rate. Past studies and proven concepts will be implemented with minimum delay. New segments will be incorporated as they are evaluated. The contributions of all Army professional logisticians are needed to make the LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE a success.
The United States Army is a highly mobile, hard-hitting combat-ready force that is quick to respond to any emergency in support of our national objectives anytime, anywhere it may be needed. A critical factor in the Army's combat readiness, and in its sustaining power, is the efficiency of its logistics system which has shown significant development and refinement in the past ten years.
In addition to internal logistics reorganization, the Army has experienced the implementation of the Department of Defense Military Standards System not only in a CONUS peacetime environment but in an oversea emergency environment brought on by the Berlin buildup in Europe and the war in Southeast Asia.
While we have made significant progress in improving the Army's logistics system, we have also isolated many areas which require improvement. Undoubtedly, the military logistician, and the American taxpayer alike, face the greatest challenge and opportunity yet provided—"Efficient and Effective Combat and Combat Readiness!"
The best and the most recent proving ground for testing the Army's improvements in logistics management is our experience in Vietnam. It might be said that the Vietnam operation is unique and therefore, we must be very careful in applying lessons learned from experience there. I would agree that, if the experience gained in Vietnam was the result of uniqueness, its general application would be improper. However, fortunately for those of us engaged in logistics, I do not believe that there is much that is unique about allied logistics support in Vietnam, at least not from the standpoint of the significant lessons learned.
MISSION OBJECTIVE
To meet the challenge of providing efficient and effective combat and combat readiness, I believe we must get our "eye on the ball" and then keep it there. The Army's logistics mission is to provide the American soldier with what he needs, where and when he needs it, in the condition required for his use! The Army's logistics doctrine, organization, systems, equipment, and training must be integrated to reach maximum efficiency and effectiveness in accomplishing this objective in the shortest practical time. To do this, the Army needs to marshal the momentum implied in the term LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE.
PROGRAM SEGMENTS
Some of the more significant logistics offensive program segments are included in the accompanying chart. Since the logistics offensive program is a broad one, it encompasses many major subprograms or segments.
This article is the first in a series on the logistics offensive. It defines in broad terms what the logistics offensive is and what its basic objectives are, defines some of the less well-known major programs, and introduces the concept of INVENTORY IN MOTION. Subsequent articles will discuss the subjects shown in the accompanying chart in greater detail. A brief discussion of some of the more significant segments of the logistics offensive program and other objectives follows:
—INVENTORY IN MOTION, a revitalized supply management program, will minimize the requirement for large stock levels at immobile depot activities in the combat zone. Integrated supply and transportation planning, realtime assets control of in-transit stocks, and more intensified management will yield rapid resupply response with smaller inventories and with reduced static stocks on the ground.
—There will be greater reliance on mobile maintenance support teams capable of quick reaction for the accomplishment of critical repairs and component replacement. This will allow greater flexibility in the scope of maintenance performed at each level.
—Through the availability of improved communications and air transportation, the echelonment of supplies, typical in the past, will be reduced in accord with revised requirements. Logistics units will be designed with a degree of mobility comparable to supported forces.
—Adoption of simplified supply procedures and greater selectivity for stockage will reduce the amount of supplies in a theater. Controlled and standardized authorized stockage lists (ASL's) and prescribed load lists (PLL's) will contribute to efficiency. Theater authorized stock age lists (TASL's) will be limited to items consumed on a recurring basis. Other items used less frequently will be provided through rapid transport from sources outside the combat zone on an expedited basis similar to RED BALL procedures. Inherent in this system is the maximizing of module maintenance, replacing components rather than piece part repair up forward.
—Expanded use of CLOSED LOOP and direct exchange procedures, used successfully for Vietnam, will provide realtime visibility and control of all intensively managed items that are critical to combat effectiveness and economic utilization of resources. This will result in economic trade-offs that will provide for more effective balance in the allocation of funds for investment and operation and maintenance.
—Standard software and integrated hardware to meet command management requirements will provide realtime logistics intelligence for proper and timely decisions providing for maximum economy of logistics forces and resources.
—Balanced logistics philosophy and management at all levels of command is required. It is essential that we balance the horizontal functional logistics management with the vertical weapon system commodity—oriented logistics management. Doctrine, systems, and training, as well as logistics career management, are being renovated to achieve this organizational objective.
—Management of logistics careers must keep pace with these improvements. A qualitative upgrading of management skills is in order. Such actions include the maintenance of a peacetime logistics sustaining base in the CONUS and overseas by the assignment of individual and unit missions to logistics personnel and TOE organizations that they must be ready to perform during a defense emergency.
Most of what has been discussed is certainly not surprising. In fact, the reader will probably say "I've heard all this before. These are a bunch of logistics cliches." And he would be right. That's exactly the point!
Much of what is needed for improvement in the Army Logistics System is well known and rather simple, but generally surrounded by a "professional mystique" that clouds the problem of resolution and implementation. We must establish an integrated logistics program that will allow us to set firm, definite intermediate and final objectives with time phasing that will force us to meet the targets established. This is the very essence of the LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE.
INVENTORY IN MOTION
This article, as the first in the series, highlights the subject of INVENTORY IN MOTION. This phrase means that we have an inventory, composed of items of supply, both serviceable and unserviceable, that is in motion. Too often, in the past, we have not recognized this inventory that is intransit and yet, we have come to recognize the great cost attached to supply in the military pipeline. Because the logistics intelligence concerning specific items that might be in the inventory intransit, on board a ship or on an aircraft, was not good, too often the items were dropped from the shipper's inventory and not picked up by the consignee until he had the items in his firm grasp on solid ground. Once on solid ground, we often lost track of this inventory through poor storage and inventory procedures.
Although we may have justified this situation in earlier times, we have no defense today. Improved communications, improved transportation, and improved computer capability, all controlled by improved command management, can and must provide the logistics intelligence required so that the items intransit can actually be accounted for better, both as to time and space, than supplies that may be on the ground in the combat zone. For example, instead of placing several hundreds or thousands of tons of ammunition in open storage in Vietnam, where it presented a very lucrative target to the enemy, we subtracted the amount on the ground by the amount flowing through the pipeline into the theater from CONUS. When consumption went up or when the enemy destroyed stocks on the ground, the combat commander could still be supported, because logistics intelligence available to the logistics commander provided the flexibility he needed to meet the requirement of the combat commander. This same technique was used advantageously in supplying petroleum.
The question arises—"What if the enemy had sea power, such as submarines, or air power that could destroy ships at sea or aircraft in the air?" "Is this not a lesson learned in a unique fight which would be dangerous to apply across the board?" I do not believe so. In the first place, if the enemy has viable air power, he may more easily attack logistics inventories on the ground than on the sea. Further, the enemy has already proved that several "sappers'' can destroy inventories that are stored in open storage in the combat zone.
INVENTORY IN MOTION does not and cannot mean a blind approach—it calls for a high degree of sophisticated logistics management. If the enemy has the capability for destroying INVENTORY IN MOTION, this capability must be assessed. Proper action must be taken to compensate for this aggressiveness. For example, that is the purpose of a safety level. Although the stockage objective is determined routinely, a "management level" must also be established that provides for an amount determined appropriate in static storage based upon the environment involved. (This management level should have its upper and lower limits within which the inventory posture will be maintained.) I really do not believe that one can honestly say that the experience gained in the use of INVENTORY IN MOTION in Vietnam is unique. To the contrary, I believe that we have not reached the full realization of the value of INVENTORY IN MOTION that should be possible in the immediate future. We have only really gained significant advantage of this technique in class Ill "bulk" and class V supplies. We are beginning to realize advantages of this in other classes of supply, such as I, II, IV, and IX. We must pursue this tenaciously to achieve the fullest practical advantage in all classes of supply.
Essential to this is continuous asset control through the coordination of the U.S. Army Materiel Command, particularly the command's Logistics Control Office, Pacific (LCOP), and the many logistics agencies in U.S. Army, Pacific including those in Vietnam. This essential continuous asset control is being established so that the item with its Federal stock number (FSN) tied in with transportation documentation can be followed from the time it enters the pipeline until it is received by the consignee, particularly at the aerial transfer points or seaports. The cooperation and coordination of such agencies as the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS) and the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) and the transfer management agencies involved play a most important part. The establishment of the 1st Logistical Command's intelligence file at the LCOP in San Francisco provided the keystone for this entire system. The maintenance of this logistics intelligence at every level of control has provided the logistics system with the tools vitally necessary to facilitate proper planning and, therefore, to operate the logistics system itself effectively and efficiently.
The facets involved are almost too numerous to mention. Too long have we tolerated lack of proper planning for the receipt of supplies through a port into a depot—too often have operators at a depot been surprised by what they found arriving in their receiving yard. With the advent of INVENTORY IN MOTION, this will no longer be the case. We will know at all times where the supplies are, and their arrival at the depot will not come as a surprise to the depot operator.
Another important facet is the control of unserviceables. Today, the CLOSED LOOP system has put some discipline in the return of unserviceables. Unfortunately, this system to date only covers a few end items and components. Proper use of INVENTORY IN MOTION will provide as complete a knowledge of unserviceables in retrograde as it does for serviceables going to a consignee.
I have been discussing the subject of INVENTORY IN MOTION in today's "state of the art." I believe it is clear that the use of this technique becomes even more essential when we talk about taking advantage of such future capabilities as the new C5A transport, which we talked about in the 1960’s, but which is with us now in the 1970's!
In essence, INVENTORY IN MOTION integrates, for the first time, the logistics functions of transportation and supply and, in dealing with unserviceables, it extends that integration into maintenance as well. Through proper management and control of, not "measurement tons,” but of items intransit, static stocks can be reduced, the echelonment of stock levels can be minimized, as well as many other advantages accrued. But most significantly, the logistician will manage an integrated system of functions rather than letting separate functions manage the logistician. Like a pipeline filled with water, INVENTORY IN MOTION will provide those responsible for control the necessary logistics intelligence to know when and how to turn the control valve to provide the user with what he needs, when he needs it, and in the proper condition.
In sum, it provides Army command management in logistics with a technique designed to increase significantly the efficiency and effectiveness with which to better serve the country and the soldier! We need to use it to the maximum degree practicable!
LTG Joseph M. Heiser Jr is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army. His previous assignment was as commanding general, 1st Logistical Command, United States Army, Vietnam. A 1960 graduate of the National War College, He was awarded a Master of Business Administration by the University of Chicago in 1956.
| Date Taken: | 12.06.2024 |
| Date Posted: | 12.06.2024 13:33 |
| Story ID: | 486856 |
| Location: | US |
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