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    Col. Sharpe Recommends Policy for Confederate Deserters (12 DEC 1863)

    Col. Sharpe Recommends Policy for Confederate Deserters (12 DEC 1863)

    Photo By Lori Stewart | Period engraving showing a Confederate deserter entering Union lines... read more read more

    by Lori S. Stewart, USAICoE Command Historian

    COL. SHARPE RECOMMENDS POLICY FOR CONFEDERATE DESERTERS
    On 12 December 1863, Col. George H. Sharpe wrote a memo to the military governor of Washington, D.C. recommending the issuance of a War Department policy regarding deserters from the Confederate Army. As chief of the Bureau of Military Information (BMI) in the Union’s Army of the Potomac, Sharpe had significant insight into the issue and the critical information to be obtained if deserters were properly treated.

    In February 1863, Sharpe, a 35-year-old lawyer in command of the 120th New York Infantry, was appointed deputy provost marshal and head of intelligence for the Army of the Potomac [see This Week in MI History #27 11 February 1863]. Over the next months, he built a remarkable organization that both gathered information and produced intelligence during some of the hardest fighting of the Civil War.

    Sharpe’s BMI was an all-source intelligence organization, but the interrogations of prisoners, deserters, and refugees constituted his largest and most consistent source of information. These three categories of individuals differed significantly in the quality and quantity of their information. Refugees proved most willing to provide information but typically lacked first-hand knowledge of military operations. Prisoners had a better understanding of their units’ organizations, leadership, condition, and operations. Having been unwillingly captured, however, they tended to be uncooperative and often gave misinformation.

    Deserters spanned the gap between the two. Many were Northern men who had been drafted into the Confederate ranks while living in the South. Feeling little to no loyalty to the Confederate States, they willingly imparted information about the military units they risked their lives to escape. Other deserters were Confederate soldiers whose homes now fell within Union lines or who had lost confidence in the South’s ability to win the war. Sharpe and his interrogators questioned the deserters about the identity and locations of their units up to corps level, when and where they entered the lines, and why they had deserted. Aware of the possibility of deception, they compared all proffered information with that of other sources. Sharpe confidently declared, “our knowledge of the rebel army is so complete that it is not believed that we could be successfully deceived in many instances …”. An assessment of the deserters’ character and “present state of mind” against a “standard of credibility” identified those genuine in their desire to remain in the North. To these men, the interrogators promised relocation and integration into civilian life in exchange for their full cooperation. Sharpe claimed, “Large numbers have gladly embraced such assurances.”

    In what military historian Peter Tsouras called an early example of a psychological warfare operation, the BMI’s kindness disproved rumors of the harsh treatment Confederate soldiers would receive if they fell into the U.S. Army’s hands. Furthermore, the promises of a life outside the military dispelled the fears of Confederate soldiers that they would be impressed into the U.S. Army and forced to fight against their own family and friends in the South. Notably, the number of deserters reaching Union lines drastically increased after the U.S. Army’s success at Gettysburg in July 1863. Sharpe’s policies likely contributed to this trend, fueled by deteriorating conditions and morale in the Confederate Army and President Lincoln’s proclamation of amnesty.

    On 12 December 1863, speaking from a year of experience, Sharpe outlined his methods in a memorandum to Brig. Gen. John H. Martindale, the military governor of Washington. He recommended the War Department “adopt a policy of preferential treatment of Confederate deserters or prisoners who wished to stay in the Union.” He felt such a policy would create positive sentiment about the Union and encourage further desertion, which, most importantly for the BMI, would enhance the intelligence the U.S. Army could obtain. Martindale received the memorandum favorably and requested Sharpe remain in Washington for additional discussion on the matter. The result was the publication, on 18 February 1864, of War Department General Orders No. 64, “Refugees and Rebel Deserters,” implementing Sharpe’s recommendations.


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    NEWS INFO

    Date Taken: 12.06.2024
    Date Posted: 12.06.2024 15:38
    Story ID: 486877
    Location: US

    Web Views: 44
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