Courtesy Photo | Soldiers of the 28th Infantry Division who had been regrouped into security platoons...... read more read more
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By Capt. Michael Sprowles
In the cold winter of 1944 and 1945, the 28th Infantry Division held the line against the German offensive that is today known as the Battle of the Bulge. This battle is one of the most well-known engagements in U.S. Military history, and places like the Ardennes and Bastogne still echo in our memories generations later.
Renowned units such as Patton’s 3rd Army and the 101st Airborne Division are often associated with this engagement; however the 28th ID was also instrumental to the Allied success. Battered and recently reconstituted from the Battle of the Hurtgen Forest, the 28th Infantry Division bore the brunt of the German attack and successfully delayed the oncoming German 5th Panzer Army.
To understand the success of the 28th ID during the Battle of the Bulge, we must understand the situation that surrounded this engagement. Leading up to this battle, Allied forces had concentrated forces along the areas north and south of the Ardennes.
Following a brutal conflict along the Siegfried line in the Hurtgen Forest, the 28th ID was relocated to the Ardennes in Luxembourg. The division moved here because at the time, this area was quiet, and they could reconstitute the 36% losses that they had sustained: 5,028 losses, almost entirely to their infantry regiments. After integrating and training new personnel for a month, however, Adolf Hitler had other plans.
Hitler saw an opportunity to attack the less-defended center of the allied forces in Luxembourg. The intent of this offenseive, Operation Autumn Mist, was a surprise attack and an advance toward Antwerp, which would split the Allied forces in two and force another allied evacuation, similar to Dunkirk.
Through the forested hills, valleys and rivers of the Ardennes, Hitler sent three armies, consisting of more than 200,000 men in 13 infantry divisions and seven panzer divisions with nearly 1,000 tanks and almost 2,000 artillery pieces. At the center of this offense was the 5th Panzer Army, with their initial objective 10 miles west, past the 28th ID defensive line.
The 28th ID arrayed itself on an extended front, across 25 miles along Skyline Drive and the Our River. The 106th ID was located to their north, having just entered theater the month prior, and the reduced 9th Armor Division and 4th ID were on the 28th ID‘s southern flank.
Due to the length of their front, the 28th ID’s 109th, 110th and 112th Infantry Regiments utilized the canalizing terrain of the Ardennes, establishing strong points along the east-west roadways of their operational area. German intelligence had identified this area as the weakest point of Allied defenses, and the optimal place to breach, enabling their panzer units to advance west, seize the key terrain of Bastogne and continue west to the Meuse River.
With the severely restricting terrain and poor road conditions in the Ardennes, controlling Bastogne meant controlling several key roadways that would enable freedom of maneuver within the operational area.
The infantry regiments of the 28th ID were arrayed with the 112th to the north, the 110th in the center, and the 109th to the south. These regiments were tasked organized with field artillery (to include the 108th) and engineering assets (to include the 103rd). However, the 28th ID forces defended an area four-times the doctrinally recommended width, and they had received nearly 80% backfills in the weeks prior. The 28th ID would directly engage seven German divisions, starting on that cold morning of Dec. 16, 1944.
28th ID Soldiers reported hearing vehicle movement across the Our River prior to the assault. At dawn, the German Reich began their assault on the 28th ID positions, intending to quickly breach the Allied defensive line, establish crossings along the Our River and advance to Bastogne. The tip of their spear, designed to penetrate the 28th ID and the Allied forces, was concentrated on the 10-mile stretch of the 110th Infantry Regiment’s defenses.
When the attack began, the 110th faced three German divisions, with two battalions and one battalion being held in division reserve. Telephone lines were destroyed in the first few minutes of fighting, and combined with thick fog, communications were severely degraded across the division. When the regiments reported that they were under attack, the scope of the enemy operation was not immediately understood by Allied command.
Mid-day on the first day of the battle, Maj. Gen. Norman Cota, commander of the 28th ID, sent two companies from the 707th Tank Battalion to reenforce the 110th strong points, and that evening, the Allies were aware that a largescale attack was underway in the 28th ID operational area.
The 28th ID was ordered to hold their positions, and they did for two days, interrupting the tempo of the German surprise attack and providing time for the Allies to reposition reinforcements.
The 28th ID defense provided time for the 10th Armored Division to move into Luxembourg on the morning of Dec. 17 and for other units to be identified and mobilized.
On that same day, Cota launched a counterattack at the town of Marnach, in the 110th operational area, where German forces were massing their advance towards Bastogne. In this counterattack, he employed the remainder of his reserves: the last battalion from the 110th and the last company from the 707th tank battalion. Although this counterattack may have gained some additional time, overwhelming forces and ammunition shortages forced the 28th ID infantry regiments to withdraw.
However, Allied movement was initiated, and the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions began movement to Bastogne and the Ardennes that evening. As the German offensive continued, the 112th Regiment was isolated during the first day of the battle and eventually withdrew northwards to join the diminished 106th Division in the defense of St. Vith.
Cota advised the 109th Regiment, to “act according to the situation,” recognizing the importance of mission command in a dynamic environment. So, the 109th Regiment traded time for space, with delaying actions and ambushes, utilizing a mobile defense as they withdrew.
The tenacity of the 28th ID forced the German forces to spend the remainder of Dec. 17 clearing strongpoints, crossing the Clerf River and clearing the 110th regimental headquarters of Clervaux. Col. Hurley E. Fuller, commander of the 110th Regiment, was the last to leave his command post, after bandaging several wounded soldiers, even as German tanks and infantry overran it.
By the time German forces had reconsolidated and were ready to advance to Bastogne on Dec. 18, the 28th ID headquarters blocked the way. Located in the mountain-pass village of Wiltz, the 28th ID HQ created a provisional battalion composed of engineers, bandsmen, telephone linemen, paymasters and others. Bolstered by reinforcements from the 10th Armored Division, they continued to delay German Reich, blocking the key roadway into Bastogne.
By the morning of Dec. 19, the entire 101st had arrived in Bastogne, the day that Wiltz finally fell to the German offensive. The 28th ID withdrew west, continuing to support efforts in Bastogne, until they were ordered to withdraw to France on Dec. 20, shortly before Bastogne was isolated by the German Reich.
When the 28th ID withdrew from the front line, the entire division consisted of roughly 200 Soldiers, three howitzers and two bazookas held in reserve. Many of the Soldiers had been injured or killed. Most of the division continued to fight until they were overrun, joined other Allied units, or were captured and forced to march through the cold snow to German POW camps.
Even as the 101st fought to retain control of Bastogne, individual soldiers from the 28th ID filtered into the city from elsewhere on the battlefield, where they acted as the Allied quick response force: Team SNAFU. With Allied forces fighting in Bastogne, several German units were effectively fixed when they surrounded the city.
The German Reich’s offensive slowed and halted east of the Meuse River, far from achieving its objective. As Allied forces continued to respond and counterattack, Bastogne was liberated from its siege, and German forces were pushed back east.
The Battle of the Bulge was the last great German offensive on the Western front; Germany sustained such heavy losses from this conflict, that they were never able to recover.
The Soviets would push the offensive on the eastern front in the following spring, followed by the collapse of the western front, leading to the surrender of the German Reich on May 7, 1945.
The 28th ID’s role in the Battle of the Bulge was instrumental to the Allied success in the Ardennes. Battered from the Battle of the Hurtgen Forest, and defending an extended front, the 28th ID bore the brunt of the German attack. In the cold winter of 1944, the 28th ID successfully delayed the oncoming German 5th Panzer Army and allowed time for Allied forces to reposition into Bastogne and the Ardennes, setting the framework for the Allied victory that hastened the end to the war.
Since then, the Battle of the Bulge has made an indelible mark on the collective memory of the world.
Winston Churchill, addressing the House of Commons about the battle said, "This is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the war and will, I believe, be regarded as an ever-famous American victory."
(Sprowles is a member of the 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team and works full-time as the curator at the Pennsylvania National Guard Military Museum at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa. He is currently deployed to Germany in support of Joint Multinational Training Group – Ukraine.)
| Date Taken: | 12.13.2024 |
| Date Posted: | 12.13.2024 14:47 |
| Story ID: | 487473 |
| Location: | US |
| Web Views: | 98 |
| Downloads: | 1 |
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