[This article was first published in Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin, which was then called Army Logistician, volume 2, number 4 (July–August 1970), pages 8–11.
The text is reproduced as faithfully as possible to enable searchability. To view any images and charts in the article, refer to the issue itself, available on DVIDS and the bulletin’s archives at asu.army.mil/alog/.]
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) is about to receive some 2,500 pages of documentation, detailing the strengths and weaknesses of America's worldwide logistics support of U.S. ground, naval, and air forces.
Authorized by the President and reporting jointly to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Logistics Review Board (JLRB) has been accumulating massive amounts of information on how the United States has supplied its own troops, the troops of friendly forces, and the military forces of the Republic of Vietnam with materiel necessary to pursue the fight against the Communist Vietnamese successfully.
Board Established
The Secretary of Defense recommended to President Richard Nixon the establishment of a logistics study group of this kind. The recommendation gained Presidential approval and the JLRB was formally established 1 March 1969. The Board was tasked to study the worldwide logistics support provided from 1 January 1965 to the present—the period commonly called the "Vietnam era." The primary concern of the Board was to identify strengths and weaknesses of the various logistics systems and procedures of the armed services. It was to document the logistics "lessons learned" from the Vietnam experience and analyze those that might have significant effect on future military operations.
The JLRB is composed of a panel of military logisticians, men who—to a great extent—have firsthand knowledge of logistics support activities in Southeast Asia. Applying this cumulative knowledge to the analysis and interpretation of the data accumulated results in realistic, practical recommendations anticipated for improving the overall logistics system.
To understand what the Board is and what it is doing, its role might be further clarified by stating what it is not. The JLRB has no punitive mission or motivations. It is not attempting to resurrect logistics errors, misjudgments, or mistakes. It is not interested in pointing a finger at any individual failures that might have occurred. Instead, it is interested in discovering the weaknesses inherent in the systems used to supply and maintain operations in Southeast Asia. By the same token, the JLRB is dedicated to the task of discovering better and more economical ways to supply and maintain operations of this kind, not only in Southeast Asia but wherever American troops might be deployed. Board recommendations will have no impact on current logistics plans, policies, operations, or procedures until such time as the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied and approved them.
Responsive Logistics
While it is readily acknowledged that the logistics efforts in Southeast Asia have been both massive and costly, it is equally true that the logistics efforts have been consistently responsive in that the American and friendly forces fighting there have been the best supplied and maintained fighting men in history. Underlying this record capacity to provide what is needed, where it is needed, when it is needed are innovative logistics strengths. The Board wants to identify and determine how to perpetuate these strengths while eliminating the inherent weaknesses encountered.
It can be safely said that once the 6,000 or more pages of raw data have been assayed, the Board's recommendations will carry as their main thrust how this nation's logistics capability can be applied more effectively and more economically in future contingency operations.
In the 15-month period that the Board has been accumulating, analyzing, and evaluating data, four specific areas of study have already resulted in recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The first JLRB recommendation was forwarded on 28 October 1969. The most recent came on 16 February 1970. These four along with the remaining recommendations will form one of the three volumes currently planned for the Board's total study and recommendations.
The October recommendation of the JLRB dealt with the redeployment of logistics personnel from Vietnam as part of the President's overall troop withdrawal and Vietnamization program. The Board recommended a slow, careful, orderly phasedown of logistics personnel. It urged the retention of sufficient logistics forces and related capabilities to insure the recovery and maintenance of assets now employed in Vietnam. Citing the extreme waste which occurred following earlier wars—particularly World War II—because of the haste in which forces were withdrawn from combat areas, the Board called for a policy that would allow assets to be recovered in suitable condition for continued use or for retention in war reserve stocks.
In November 1969, the Board reported favorably on a study of port operations made by the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service. The Board was impressed with the potential hard-dollar savings and increased operating efficiency of terminals and ocean shipping that may be realized through use of predesignated ports. In addition, the Board noted in its memorandum that oversea commands could enjoy better service through receipt of consolidated shipments and that the overall order and shipping time could be reduced with significant savings in the cost of the pipeline.
In December 1969, it forwarded a memorandum stating intention to report favorably on U.S. Air Force efforts to improve its mobility and ability to respond promptly to contingency requirements in a bare base environment. This memorandum resulted from the Board's viewing an Air Force demonstration of prefabricated, packaged, recoverable structures that allowed operations to commence rapidly from a previously “bare" area.
The most recent interim recommendation was submitted by the JLRB on 16 February 1970. At the invitation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installation and Logistics), the Board reviewed and commented on the General Accounting Office's (GAO) investigation of the inspection, distribution, and transportation of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) in Southeast Asia.
The GAO recommended establishing a Defense-wide centralization of responsibility for POL operations. The JLRB disagreed with that portion of the GAO report. Having reviewed in depth all aspects of the effectiveness and economy of defense POL operations during the Vietnam era, the Board concluded that requirements determination and the ownership and management of reserve and operating stocks should properly remain vested in the military departments. The Board concurred, however, with GAO recommendations for clarifying division of responsibilities, strengthening authority to discharge responsibility, developing compatible procedures to interface between the uniformed services and the Defense Supply Agency, and establishing a field assistance capability under the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) to provide continuing appraisal of effectiveness and economy of DOD POL operations.
Report Contents
Subjects treated in the already-published recommendations of the JLRB form a part of what is anticipated to be appendixes to the main report—monographs on selected functional and commodity areas of the Southeast Asia logistics effort. The major contents of the JLRB report are expected to consist of—
• Scenario of the Vietnam conflict.
• Logistics posture at the start of the buildup.
• Responsibilities and logistics systems of the services.
• Effectiveness and responsiveness of support.
• Impact on readiness worldwide.
• Strengths, weaknesses, and lessons learned.
• Recommendations.
In its published form, the Board's findings are currently expected to fill some 2,500 pages, organized into three separate volumes and several monographs. While the task of consolidating so broad and complex a study into three volumes staggers the imagination, that task is dwarfed by the earlier task of accumulating and processing of data during the earlier months of evaluation and analysis.
Helping the 8 Board members collect, analyze, and evaluate that mountain of information are 102 review staff and 170 administrative personnel.
The 102-member review staff, composed of 91 officers and 11 civilians, represents the following services: Army-30; Navy-27; Marine Corps-19; Air Force-21; and DSA-5. Administrative personnel, composed of 4 officers, 19 enlisted personnel, and 47 civilians includes: Army-24; Navy-18; Marine Corps-2; Air Force-20; and DSA-6.
In-depth Research
One of the first actions of the Board was to elicit field responses by sending letters directly to approximately 200 recipients. It also spent 268 hours in 112 briefings presented by commodity managers, auditors, and contractors, members of the General Accounting Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the individual services.
When the data was refined, six major issues emerged requiring resolution. Briefly stated, these issues are:
• Realistic planning for logistics support of contingencies.
• Responsive requirements determination, program authorization, and funding control processes.
• Reduction of in-theater logistics operations.
• Adaptable management systems and controls for transition from peace to war.
• Rational concepts of interservice support, common supply, and services.
• Force structure and training to insure logistics readiness of both combat and support personnel.
In June and July, when the Board has completed its assigned task and the final pages have run through the press, there may be an expression of disappointment among some within the logistics community if they expected recommendations for sweeping changes, radical new procedures, and extensive reorganizations. The JLRB had no such mission—per se.
In some future emergency, in some unexpected location, Americans may gratefully acknowledge that, because of the timely and monumental effort of these men and women, this Nation is able to mount and sustain a logistics operation which spells the difference between defeat and victory.
| Date Taken: | 12.19.2024 |
| Date Posted: | 12.19.2024 10:28 |
| Story ID: | 487927 |
| Location: | US |
| Web Views: | 15 |
| Downloads: | 0 |
This work, The Joint Logistics Review Board: A Study of Worldwide Logistics Support of Combat Forces in the Vietnam Era, an ALOG Staff Feature, Thomas A. Johnson , Editor, must comply with the restrictions shown on https://www.dvidshub.net/about/copyright.
