[This article was first published in Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin, which was then called Army Logistician, volume 2, number 4 (July–August 1970), pages 18–21.
The text is reproduced as faithfully as possible to enable searchability. To view any images and charts in the article, refer to the issue itself, available on DVIDS and the bulletin’s archives at asu.army.mil/alog/.]
IT’S NO SECRET among ARMY LOGISTICIAN readers that there’s a generator problem. Our experience in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) provides an excellent case in point. Starting with the buildup of our forces in 1965, demands rapidly developed for vast amounts of electrical power that far exceeded any previous logistics experience. After Korea, our planners envisioned a need for 0.5 kilowatts per man in determining gross combat theater power generation requirements. Today, the total capability of power generation equipment delivered to the Republic of Vietnam is nearer 2.5 kilowatts per man.
Our power generation requirements today range from small, quiet portable sets for the front lines to boxcar-sized plants required to light and operate base camps, ports, and airbases. Most of our existing and oncoming weapons and equipment systems require self-contained electrical power. In Vietnam alone, the total power generation capability of the military’s tactical and base power generators exceeds the installed public utility generating capacity of the State of Hawaii. This fivefold increase in requirements can be partially attributed to the virtual lack of commercial power sources in the Republic of Vietnam and to the vast base, port, and airfield construction programs.
Unforeseen requirements, such as the need to power air conditioners in communications shelters and refrigeration equipment in forward tactical bases; the extensive use of troop comfort items, such as fans and portable television sets, and the need for perimeter security lighting have all had a major impact. Power requirements for new weapons and equipment systems—the field artillery’s fire control computers; the supply activity’s computers; the airfield’s radars; the counter-mortar’s radars; and the xenon searchlights, the intrusion-detection devices, and the new communications gear—are introducing increasing numbers of generators into our combat and support units. For future planners, there are many lessons and as many questions.
Meeting the vast power generation requirements in Vietnam has not been accomplished without difficulties. Faced with demands far in excess of available power generation assets, the military services were forced into massive procurement programs, expedited overhaul efforts, and worldwide redistribution of generator assets. Soon after the buildup began, generator sets of all sizes, makes, and models were flowing into Southeast Asia. As the quantity and variety of generator sets proliferated, demands for an ever-increasing variety of repair parts, technical manuals, special tools, and test equipment clogged the supply systems of the military services. While the buildup continued, reports from Vietnam commanders, from liaison officers, and from touring VIP’s and the buildup of power requirements in national procurement and supply activities all pointed to three central facts: power requirements would continue to increase; sufficient assets were not on hand; and too many of the assets on hand were not operational.
Thus, each of the military services faced the threat of a breakdown in its ability to support the electric power requirements of its forces in Southeast Asia. As each of the services wrestled to contain its power generation problem within tolerable limits, a deepening awareness developed within each service and the Department of Defense (DOD) that something had to be done to correct the situation and decisive steps taken to prevent a future recurrence of the problem. Therefore, late in 1965, Secretary Vance, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, requested an in-depth study of the power generation problem, its root causes, and possible solutions. A DOD ad hoc working group composed of DOD, military department, and Defense Supply Agency representatives undertook the task.
By January 1967, the study, which was a detailed and thoroughly documented analysis of the generator problem, was completed and approved. In summary, the report concluded that “the problems encountered with engine generators in the areas of procurement, production, provisioning, supply, maintenance, training and logistics support are, in the main, attributable to the past and present proliferation of variety and the inventory shortage to meet military requirements.” To prevent recurrence of the problem, the ad hoc working group recommended the appointment of a DOD project manager, mobile electric power (MEP), as the single DOD focal point for generators. Additionally, the group recommended development of DOD policy governing the mandatory use of standard electric power generating sources in new weapons and equipment systems design.
These recommendations were approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and DOD project managership was given to the Army. After preparation and coordination of the project manager’s charter among the military services and the Defense Supply Agency, the DOD project manager, mobile electric power, was established to initiate a coordinated DOD-wide effort effective 1 July 1967. The assignment of a project manager to develop a standard family of mobile electric power generator sets is believed to be a first for an item less than a major weapon system.
The keystone of the project is the development of the first generation DOD standard family of mobile electric power sources. Initially, the intent was to use existing generator sets to establish the family; however, early in the project, it became apparent that, with a few exceptions, adoption of present sets could not be achieved without major modification of these sets to meet the specifications and requirements of all the services and that adoption and modification of these sets would have never resulted in the desired level of standard design and interchangeability of components between sets. The decision was then made to develop the new sets required to meet joint service requirements. Interservice approval (Army, Air Forces, Navy, Marine Corps) of the first design for a DOD family of mobile electric power generator sets was announced recently. Figure 1 reflects the first generation of the DOD standard family. Figure 2 shows the broad types and classes of power generation equipment.
The Army’s military design family of small tactical (0.5–10 kw.) gasoline-engine-driven generator sets are scheduled for incorporation into the DOD family. Since Vietnam represents our first extended combat experience with these small sets, an intensive product improvement program has been initiated to draw on this experience. Improved component reliability is a major element of this program. Specifications covering the small tactical military design (0.5 kw.) diesel-engine-driven generators have been prepared by a joint service working group under Marine Corps chairmanship. Procurement of small diesel-engine-driven generator set prototypes was initiated in the fall of 1969 and will be available for quantity production in 1972.
Procurement action for the 15–200 kilowatt diesel-engine-driven tactical members of the family began in early 1969. Borrowing a currently popular term from the computer industry, these procurements include such “software” as technical manuals, maintainability plans, mathematical reliability models and test plans, and repair parts provisioning lists. Prototype deliveries under these engineering-production contracts are expected in mid-1971. Upon delivery, the prototype models will be tested by a jointly developed DOD test plan. After testing and acceptance of hardware, full production on this multiyear procurement will proceed in the latter part of 1971.
Specifications for the 500 kilowatt and larger tactical generators, prime members of the family, have been prepared under Navy chairmanship. Due to the low density involved versus the high cost of developing military design sets, the services will competitively procure and standardize on modified commercial hardware in these larger ratings. These generators will be procured on an as-required basis. Specifications for the 60–200 kilowatt prime members of the family have been prepared under Air Force chairmanship. While these will be military design generator sets, procurement for these items will also be on an as-required basis.
During the period preceding production deliveries of the first generation family members, an interim family of 69 sets was selected from the 2,000 plus sets currently in the inventory. These generators are listed in MIL STD 633B and are the only sets authorized for procurement without formal approval by the project manager. MIL STD 633C, when published in 1970, will reflect only the first generation DOD family and will also incorporate an interim family of gas-turbine-powered generators selected from those currently in or soon to enter the DOD inventory. At that time, virtually all programing will be for the new sets. Actual conversion of the existing inventory over to the new DOD family will be on an attrition basis and over a period of several years. Each service will plan and fund its own conversion and will phase out older nonstandard sets using joint mobile electric power repair and disposal criteria.
Future effort will be directed toward further reductions in the family of generators and development of a second generation family that will include turbo-alternators. Research and development effort is focused primarily on short- and middle-range projects. The primary midrange project is to field a second generation DOD standard family of turbine-engine-driven generator sets and special purpose fuel cells and thermoelectric devices by mid-1970.
The most probable approach, now being explored among the military services, is to develop this second generation family around the turbo-alternator concept. Turbo-alternators, which couple the turbine engine and high speed alternator on a single shaft, give promise of a major advance in providing simple, lightweight, reliable, and versatile power generation sources. This advance is summarized in figure 3 which compares the 10-kilowatt turbo-alternator and a current gasoline-engine-driven 10-kilowatt military design set. Through use of a solid state cycloconverter, either 50, 60, or 400 hertz power will be available on the one set. Progress to date clearly indicates that the necessary technical breakthroughs are being achieved. Although a few types of fuel cells and thermoelectric devices may be fielded for special purpose use as part of the second generation family, their application and impact on the DOD standard family are considered at this time to be long range. The defining of this second generation family, including identification of ratings required, recuperative gas turbo engine applications, and the extent to which the turbo-alternator concept will be applied, is now being addressed by the project manager and the military services.
By now, you may have decided that while there have been problems, there isn’t much glamour and excitement in the military generator field. Maybe there isn’t much glamour in generators, but there is an old adage that “the first two things a commander wants are communications and lights.” You might also consider that when those lights fail there’s excitement enough for everyone.
The project manager’s job is to see that commanders get the power for both, that they can maintain it, and that they can rely on it.
Major John M. Gamino is the Executive Officer, Office of Project Manager, Mobile Electric Power, the U.S. Army Materiel Command, Washington, D.C. A 1960 graduate of Oklahoma State University with a bachelor of science degree in industrial management, Major Gamino has served in a variety of command and staff assignments in continental United States and in the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Vietnam, and the Federal Republic of Germany.
| Date Taken: | 12.19.2024 |
| Date Posted: | 12.19.2024 14:34 |
| Story ID: | 487990 |
| Location: | US |
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