National Intelligence Estimate Warns of Soviet-Iranian Pact (3 FEB 1959)

Photo By Erin Thompson | Official flag of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)  

UNITED STATES

01.31.2025

Story by Erin Thompson 

U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

by Erin E. Thompson, USAICoE Staff Historian

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE WARNS OF SOVIET-IRANIAN PACT
On Feb. 3, 1959, the U.S. State Department published a special national intelligence estimate (SNIE) warning of the potential consequences from a Soviet Union-Iran nonaggression pact. Such an alliance threatened to dismantle the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and further destabilize the Middle East.

In the early 1950s, the United States and its Western allies desired to create a command similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to combat communist influence in the Middle East. This desire was fulfilled in February 1955 when Turkey and Iraq signed the Baghdad Pact, promising to resist outside aggression and promote shared goals for peace and safety in the Middle East. Over the next year, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Iran also joined the pact. The U.S. refrained from joining the new organization, though it signed individual treaties with the member nations.

Without an established defense command or substantial Western funding, the Baghdad Pact failed to provide meaningful support to its members. Many of the Middle Eastern nations viewed the pact as needless Western intervention into Arab affairs. The ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis, and U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958 contributed significantly to regional instability and further weakened its influence. In July 1958, a military coup in Iraq overthrew the government, and the new republic withdrew from the pact altogether. The organization then moved its headquarters from Baghdad to Ankara, Turkey, and the name was changed from the Baghdad Pact to CENTO.

In a surprise turn of events in late January 1959, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, a staunch anti-communist, met with a Soviet delegation in Tehran to discuss a potential nonaggression treaty. On Feb. 3, 1959, the State Department, using intelligence collected by the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence organizations, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, published a SNIE outlining reasons the shah might consider such a pact.

Pahlavi’s rule in Iran had been supported by the Eisenhower administration when it backed his regime against an attempted coup in 1953, and this assistance from the U.S. led many Iranians to view Pahlavi as a puppet for Western interests. The SNIE noted that Pahlavi’s “sense of insecurity has been heightened by the overthrow of the Nuri Said regime [in Iraq], the growth of Communist influence in Iraq, and continued Soviet aid to Afghanistan.” By entering into a nonaggression pact, Pahlavi wished to distance himself from the perceived U.S. control of his monarchy while also mitigating communist influence in Iran.

The SNIE’s greatest concern regarding the nonaggression pact stemmed from its implications for CENTO. Although the U.S. intelligence community believed the proposed Soviet-Iranian pact was a ploy by Pahlavi to gain more aid from Western allies, it acknowledged the inadequate support provided by CENTO in the late 1950s was also responsible for Pahlavi’s decision. The organization’s charter depended on Iran’s continued involvement, but Iran’s commitment to CENTO and its regular dealings with Western advisors potentially violated a 1921 Soviet-Iran treaty banning Iran from stationing foreign military forces within its borders. If Iran did not have a strong reason to remain in CENTO, U.S. intelligence organizations feared the USSR would demand the nation withdraw from the pact.

Pahlavi ultimately pulled out of negotiations when the Soviets refused to nullify the 1921 provisions in exchange for the nonaggression pact. A new NIE published in March 1959 noted, “the Shah’s abrupt termination of negotiations” had significantly soured Soviet-Iranian relations, and though it seemed unlikely the Soviets would invade Iran, “[the USSR] will probably bring economic pressures to bear and will try to subvert the Shah’s regime by clandestine means.” Pahlavi’s regime continued to face internal and external troubles over the next two decades. Likewise, the threat of Soviet influence, as well as numerous regional conflicts in the Middle East, continued to plague CENTO until it ultimately dissolved following the Iranian Revolution of 1979.


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• Date Taken: 01.31.2025
• Date Posted: 01.31.2025 15:35
• Story ID: 489899
• Location: US