[This article was first published in Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin, which was then called Army Logistician, volume 2, number 6 (November–December 1970), page 4–9. The text, including any biographical note, is reproduced as faithfully as possible to enable searchability. To view any images and charts in the article, refer to the issue itself, available on DVIDS and the bulletin’s archives at asu.army.mil/alog/.]
“Preparation for the preservation of our freedom must come in peacetime, and we must pay for it in money and in inconvenience. The alternative ... is payment in blood and extinction.”
— GENERAL BREHON SOMERVELL
Commanding General of Army Service Forces in World War II
MUCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN over the years about the Army’s production base. Some writers question the need of the Government to own or control it. Others support the requirement and even argue for increased governmental control and ownership. Finally, some question the authority for it.
Few individuals will argue against our need to prepare to defend ourselves and our allies. Even then most of them will support the concept that if this is to be done it should be done in the most efficient and effective manner possible with continued effort to improve the system. The premise of this article is that we need to continue part of the base, we need to eliminate portions of the base, and then we need to clarify authority for and ownership of all of it to insure the utmost in effective and efficient utilization.
Broadly speaking, this is the intent of the LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE — to insure that the Army Logistics System creates and/or adopts the technological advances to insure accurate calculation of requirements, efficient transportation and storage, effective utilization, and, finally, beneficial disposal if appropriate. In other words, we must insure that we obtain the maximum in logistics benefits from every Army logistics dollar spent. Previous issues of the Army Logistician have treated a specific area of the offensive. This article considers the Industrial Production Base Program as the cornerstone of the Army’s LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE.
The Army's production base is an extremely large and versatile complex. Although it realized its peak during World War II, the Army-owned production base now consists of 55 active and inactive facilities that provide the Army with such things as tanks, missiles, weapons, and nearly all the explosives, metal parts, and related load, assemble, and pack operations required to provide ammunition.
The production base is made up of Government-owned plants, Government-owned equipment in the hands of private contractors, and privately owned and operated facilities. The Army-owned plants and equipment have an estimated replacement value of nearly nine billion dollars. Some of the plants are operated by the Government. However, the majority of the base, although owned by the Government, is operated by private contractors who are selected competitively. Government facilities are included in the concept of the base to supplement, where necessary, production from private industry.
The military-industrial complex, in terms of Army use, really means there are two distinct categories. First is that group of private producers from which a multitude of items common to both the needs of the Army and the civilian economy are purchased. This could include items produced for the economy such as construction equipment which is readily adaptable to military use. Much of our electronic and communications equipment is manufactured by this element of the base. In many cases the Government must furnish all or part of the equipment required to produce the desired end item because the production can be obtained in no other way. The second element of the base is the facilities necessary to produce items or equipment that do not have commercial counterparts, such as military peculiar ammunition, large caliber weapons and heavy military combat vehicles. Here the profit motive of American industry, together with fluctuating requirements for military hardware, virtually preclude private ownership of the base simply because, during periods of limited demand, the contractor cannot afford to maintain the idle plant.
Profits must be forthcoming if private industry is to survive. Experiences gained in the last several years of the Vietnam War, as well as during all previous conflicts, clearly substantiate the wide fluctuations in demand for military products. It is this area of the base, our Government-owned plants, that the Army currently considers critical. Particularly, this is apropos of the ammunition production base.
The ammunition production base is composed of 25 ammunition plants, five arsenals, and four chemical plants. Practically speaking, most of the ammunition production comes from the Government-owned, contractor-operated ammunition plants. These plants, for the most part, were built during World War II when materials were extremely hard to get and the critical factor of time precluded the logical development of highly efficient operations. Some processes were almost identical to those used during World War I. Other processes developed near the onset of World War II for the production of munitions items were nothing more than scaled-up versions of laboratory equipment.
The essentiality of this base, whether privately owned or Government-owned, should never be seriously questioned. This is particularly true for those products having no reasonable commercial mass production application, such as certain types of weapons and ammunition. The soldier in the field can exist for limited periods of time without a large supply of clothing, rations, and other similar items. Without helicopters, he can ride into battle in ground vehicles: without vehicles, he can walk. In a dire emergency, he can ration his food or even forage for food. Without ammunition, however, or the means to fire that ammunition, the soldier's ability to wage war, except in a primitive fashion, comes to a halt.
The essentiality of the base cannot be the justification for retention of every facility or every item of equipment. Critics have expressed the conviction that the Army retains facilities in excess of requirements, and of questionable value. Admittedly, much of our equipment is of questionable value due to obsolescence. Further. some of the plants are badly deteriorated due to prolonged use, inadequate maintenance, and age.
The disposal, retention, and modernization of facilities are accomplished through authorized programs. Each decision in the area of retention, modernization, or disposal is a value judgement. This is the heart of the problem. These problems are compounded by budget limitations that prevent replacement on a large scale, and even limit the ability of the staff to systematically evaluate the entire production base. Although all facets of the production base require upgrading to some degree, the most critical deficit lies in the facilities for ammunition production. Consequently, the priority effort to modernize the production base in terms of the LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE is oriented to updating these facilities.
Before examining the specifics of the ammunition production base modernization program, it is necessary to examine other areas where major efforts are being made under the umbrella of the LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE to improve overall operations of the production base. To do this we must first understand certain basic factors that have a direct bearing on the production of military materiel.
Requirements are admittedly the prime factor of the base. Finding out what is needed is a key problem of the logistician. In terms of the industrial base, requirements calculations are very complex operations. Production base requirements are derived from an evaluation of production capacity for a given item and the requirement for that item. Thus, before base requirements can be calculated, accurate materiel requirements must be calculated for the authorized forces.
In essence, the Army Staff uses the national strategy as a foundation for the authorized forces. These forces are then structured and equipped to satisfy missions derived from the strategy. By using these elements, total materiel requirements can be computed. This includes the items required for current procurement and utilization, the items required for preparation for war, and the prediction of what the total force requirement would be in the event of war. The process of matching production capacity to materiel requirements can be structured for analysis. This provides the planner a basis for developing the response of the base. Five sets of calculations must be made: forecasted materiel requirements; total base capability; capability of individual producers; mobilization reserve stocks; and comparison of capacity versus requirements. Each of these is complex and the answer can vary considerably depending upon the input, such as rate of consumption, time, size of force, or density of weapon systems. It is obvious that requirements calculation is a complex task which subjects the planner to many pitfalls and much question.
Base Ownership and Retention
As indicated earlier the base consists of three principal elements — completely private, Government-owned and contractor-operated, and Government-owned and Government-operated. Obviously, participation by the first is voluntary and control by the Army is limited. This effectively limits our intelligence concerning these facilities and their capacities as well as response time. But it furnishes us certain flexibility in terms of freedom of choice and timing of buys as well as freeing the Government of primary responsibility for maintenance when not in use. The Government-owned facilities correct the control problem but lead to retention-analysis problems. Expansion of the base also requires careful analysis to determine which group provides the new facility. Policy dictates that facilities be privately owned if at all possible. However, few producers are willing to construct and equip new facilities to satisfy a purely military requirement. Like “requirement” ownership and retention are complex questions with no easy answers.
Budget Considerations
From the two previous factors it is easy to see that sufficient budget authorizations could solve the problem. In terms of the production base planner, budgets are a formal limitation on every facet of the operation from the size and rate of procurement to the level of readiness and level of general maintenance of the facilities. This program like all others suffers when the budgets are reduced.
Technology is another major factor. It impacts on the production base in two principal ways. The first way is in terms of production facilities. Most of our facilities were hastily built during the early days of World War II, utilizing the technology available. For the most part, these facilities, the processes used, and the equipment have all been long since bypassed by technological changes. These changes include both the production and control processes. Simultaneously the technology of warfare has changed. This leads to new requirements for basic metals, better durability, safety, and other related changes. Each change ultimately impacts upon the structure of the base. The planners task is one of selecting the best technological approach to replace obsolete systems or equipment. This like the other factors is seldom a simple choice.
The last major factor is the history of preparedness planning and the production base program. Historically, they have gone from feast to famine in terms of authorized effort and budget. When danger is imminent, the base is activated and utilized; but when the danger is gone, so is the necessary support for proper maintenance of the facilities. The hastily constructed facilities that served us so well during World War II, in spite of their constant use and basic inefficiency, were “mothballed” during 1946–47. The Nation clearly did not visualize needing these plants for a long time. Consequently, only minimum essential maintenance was performed to keep the inactive plants in some degree of usefulness.
Korean War Activation
When activation occurred in support of the Korean War in mid-1950, the ammunition industry had to be virtually re-created at great expense in terms of both time and dollars. Skilled workers had to be recruited from other industries, a difficult task overcome only through much higher wages and extensive and time-consuming training programs. This factor had been ignored during demobilization. Contributing to the time delay were problems encountered in procuring machine tools. Tools, such as lathes and large presses, are absolutely essential in the production of ammunition; but owing to their complexity, it often takes upwards of two years from the time an order is placed to fabricate many of them. Before World War II, the Government ordered some tools sufficiently in advance to insure their availability by the time that the United Staces entered the war. This was not the case in 1950, however, and extreme measures were required to acquire machine tools as fast as we did. Hopefully, we have learned our lesson in this area, for current policy provides that critical machine tools can be retained by the Government in a standby capacity. Following the Korean War the base was once again shut down and “mothballed.”
To support the Vietnam War this antiquated base was activated and expanded at great cost. In 1964 and 1965 the total Army procurement program for ammunition was $770 million a year. In 1966, however, activation began in earnest and procurement jumped to $3 billion. Prior to this time, 11 ammunition plants were producing at a low level for peacetime consumption and minimum Southeast Asia support requirements. The increased ammunition requirements, however, necessitated the activation of several additional plants.
The planning functions have faired in a similar vein. However, over the years there has been a continuity in planning and the planning function has accomplished major goals, such as the retention of industrial facilities under the 1948 act of Congress and the selection of planned producers for selected items. Currently, there is a detailed base-retention plan for the ammunition base that identifies facilities, allocates production capacities, and identifies shortfalls of base capabilities for management action. It identifies an organizational element for production base planning from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to the U. S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) subordinate commands, but the organizational structure, like the base, has suffered cuts due to budget limitations.
Where do we stand? Having operated this base intensively in support of three wars, the Army can, in certain instances, no longer get adequate replacement parts for the equipment which is now old and worn out. In some cases, inactive lines have been cannibalized to keep the production base going in support of Southeast Asia. In addition to worn out and obsolete equipment, some of the working conditions in the production base, by comparison to those in industry, are substandard, to say the least. It has reached the point where, unless the Army restores and improves these plants, it will serve no useful purpose to lay them away again, because they simply will be unable to start up without colossal expenditures in time and money. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel and many others support the Army Staff evaluation of the facilities. Most of our facilities have staggering inefficiencies built into the system, have, in many cases, deplorable working conditions, and contribute tremendous amounts of pollutants into the environment daily.
Two alternatives are available to the Army. One route to military preparedness is to satisfy requirements by stockpiling huge inventories of equipment and munitions. Such inventories are extremely risky, expensive to maintain, and virtually cost-prohibitive to procure. A second route to preparedness uses carefully selected inventories of critical items in conjunction with the support of committed modern industrial production capacity to satisfy forecasted requirements. This second alternative supports the goals of the Army’s LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE. It requires full use of automated management techniques and demands careful attention to planning and control of long-range actions.
The industrial base is derived from preparedness plans. Thus both should be considered as a system. As implied earlier, the continuity in planning has faired belter than facilities, but much remains to be done to insure that an adequate system exists.
Much is being done within USAMC to improve planning. For example, considerable effort is being applied today to improve the calculations and analysis of materiel requirements; improve the analysis of the capabilities of the production base; and by production intelligence improve selection of producers. To improve the management of current procurement, USAMC has initiated a major effort called PROMAP-70 (Program for Refinement of the Materiel Acquisition Program for the 1970’s). These efforts closely parallel those of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) under the LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE. The DCSLOG has published AR 700-90, Army Industrial Preparedness Program, to consolidate and clarify policy on preparedness and production base planning. Finally, considerable effort is being expended to improve the flow of information, both in terms of guidance and of managerial data for control or decision purposes.
However, as the LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE progresses and significant progress is made in reducing stock, through better storage and transportation systems as well as in handling and requisitioning procedures, the stockpiles that have long been the cushion for filling requirements while the base mobilizes will be stripped away. If stockpiles are trimmed, production base reaction must be improved. This increases the requirement for more accurate and more timely information for analysis purposes.
Improved Management
The DCSLOG is currently developing a study requirement to develop an economic model that will determine the most effective allocations of given fund levels among war reserve stock, active inventories, and production capabilities. The model, by use of automated processes, will furnish tabular and graphic displays for management of preparedness planning. Further, the logistics staff is about to publish a regulation to automate the system for furnishing managerial data on all production base projects.
Since success in the production base depends upon modernization of the base, it is axiomatic that to be effective and efficient the base must utilize the latest accepted technology. In fact a large portion of the base requires rehabilitation. This requirement is not new nor has it been neglected. It has been a matter of great concern and extensive action on the part of the DCSLOG and has been recognized and approved by the Army Secretariat, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress. It is, however, an expensive proposition. So much of the base is so old and obsolete that the final objective cannot be accomplished overnight. Further, modernization efforts are complicated now because these facilities are being used. In many cases, to rehabilitate means to “shut down” — at least temporarily; and this the Army cannot afford to do at this time. Certainly though, it is of utmost importance that it should be accomplished immediately after the requirements for Southeast Asia subside and before these facilities are laid away again.
Through the LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE, $2.3 billion has been identified as being required to meet the minimum standards of preparedness. The accomplishment of objectives will be carried out on a priority basis over the next several years with major emphasis being placed on the projects that offer the greatest return in terms of savings and pollution abatement. The first increment of this program, amounting to $184 million, was initiated in fiscal year 1970. The second increment of $115 million for fiscal year 1971 has been approved. Indications are that future expenditures will be compatible with the Army's ability to perform the required work.
Cornerstone of Survival
The production base is essential not only to the Army and the entire Department of Defense but, more important, to every American and all our allies. It is as much an essential ingredient to global power as a large standing Army. As a matter of fact, without it, the Army cannot operate.
Under the LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE, our preparedness planning insures our ability to respond even while we reduce our current force levels. Concurrently, it eliminates facilities no longer needed and identifies base shortfalls for managerial action. Our industrial preparedness plans, which are based upon selected inventories and modern industrial facilities, provide the maximum in support to our forces within budgetary limitations.
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Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Kemp is deputy chief of the Industrial Facilities and Preparedness Branch, PEMA Execution Division, ODCSLOG. He holds a master’s degree in business administration.
Lieutenant Colonel James C. Blewster is commanding officer of the 68th Transportation Battalion, Ft. Carson, Colorado. He was formerly deputy chief of the Industrial Facilities and Preparedness Branch, PEMA Execution Division, ODCSLOG. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds a master’s degree in industrial management.
| Date Taken: | 02.27.2025 |
| Date Posted: | 02.27.2025 14:55 |
| Story ID: | 491710 |
| Location: | US |
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