[This article was first published in Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin, which was then called Army Logistician, volume 2, number 6 (November–December 1970), pages 10–13. The text, including any biographical note, is reproduced as faithfully as possible to enable searchability. To view any images and charts in the article, refer to the issue itself, available on DVIDS and the bulletin’s archives at asu.army.mil/alog/.]
Army Logistician reported in the July-August issue on actions of the Joint Logistics Review Board. The Board has now completed its investigations and issued a comprehensive report. The Board, under the chairmanship of General Frank S. Besson, Jr., studied worldwide logistics activities during the “Vietnam era” — the period from 1 January 1965 to mid-1970. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense have accepted the report that consists of 21 separate documents and contains 261 recommendations for increasing efficiency and economy in logistics.
The report is now being studied by the Subcommittee on Military Operations (the Holifield Committee) of the House of Representatives. In presenting the Board’s report to the Holifield Committee, General Besson singled out 15 of the recommendations as “major” and four of the 15 as particularly significant.
Since the Board’s recommendations have wide reader interest and are expected to have a considerable impact on future logistics operations, General Besson’s explanation of the recommendations appear below. His presentation has been somewhat condensed by deleting background data and edited only to the extent required to meet available magazine space.
— TAJ (Thomas A. Johnson)
THE BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS cover a wide range of subjects. Some are designed to improve responsiveness of logistics operations, but most are centered on ways to increase efficiency and economy. From the standpoint of the combat soldier, logistics operations in support of combat in Southeast Asia were extremely effective — but equal or better support could have been rendered at less cost.
Reduce requirements for in-country logistics resources — The root causes of logistics inefficiencies in Vietnam were: First — the need to conduct complex operations with limited, and in some cases, nonexistent facilities. Second — inadequate number of trained supply, maintenance, and transportation units and personnel ... The Board devoted particular attention therefore toward reducing requirements for logistics support without impairing the effectiveness of support to combat units. There are clear indications that logistics requirements can be substantially reduced and that, concurrently, the effectiveness of support can be maintained and even improved.
The key to reduction of requirements for logistics resources in-theater is to reduce the indirect labor and facility requirements associated with what might be called the direct requirements to feed, supply, house, and otherwise provide essentials to combat units. Briefly stated, the objective should be, “Don't do anything near combat that can be done in a safe, sophisticated area. …”
One of the most important steps toward minimizing in-country logistics resources is reduction in the range and depth of items stocked in the oversea area. It is obvious, that the less there is to manage, the better the efficiency should be.
In the fall of 1966, the Army stock list in Vietnam contained nearly 200,000 line items. ... Stocking 200,000 lines generates a large requirement for storage facilities and for data processing capability, creates a huge workload in handling changes in the stockage list, and eventually causes an inaccurate data base because of the difficulty in identifying supplies and in keeping accurate locator records. The end result is saturation of the oversea supply system so that even high-demand items cannot be managed effectively. ... Only truly high-demand items should be stocked in oversea areas. Air transportation and parcel post should be relied upon for all infrequently demanded items except those patently not suitable because of size or weight. Of course, airlift should continue to be used for high dollar and high priority items.
Exploit containerization — Containerization will also make a significant contribution to the reduction of in-country logistics workload.
Containerization has already created a revolution in commercial shipping where operators have recently invested several billion dollars in containerships and supporting facilities to reap the significant benefits of increased mechanization. There is also active interest in containers in air transport with the civilian industry forecasting that 80 percent of all air freight will move in containers by the mid-1970’s.
In January 1970, a self-sustaining containership was used in a test to move 226 containers of ammunition from the United States to Cam Ranh Bay. Some containers were moved by lighterage to Qui Nhon and then into the interior to Ahn Ke, Pleiku, and forward. The test went so well that the 1st Log Command recommended the initiation of regularly scheduled ammunition resupply in containerships to reduce order and ship time with attendant savings in pipeline inventory and also stated that provision of this service would result in phasing down the ammunition depot at Qui Nhon.
A study made under contract to the JLRB estimated the savings which would have resulted if the principle of maximum use of containerization had been possible in Vietnam. ... Although the Board did not necessarily completely endorse all assumptions and cost factors, it did generally agree that ... over ¾ billion dollars [in savings and cost avoidance could have been realized]. ... In the support phase of contingency operations, 80 percent of resupply tonnage will fit in a standard 8- x 8- x 20-foot container. Most of the major logistics problems encountered in Vietnam could have been significantly alleviated by proper systems applications of containerization. For example:
• Inadequate port capabilities. Containerships can be discharged seven to ten times faster than break-bulk ships with fewer personnel on each shift.
• Lack of storage facilities. Containers provide immediate covered storage thereby reducing the requirement for construction of facilities during the critical buildup period.
• Poor identification of supplies. The Cam Ranh Bay operation proved that cards prepunched in the United States covering the content of the container can speed up the documentation of assets and reduce errors in inventory and locator records.
• Loss and damage of supplies. All recipients of containerized cargo were enthusiastic about reduction of loss, theft, and damage, particularly for ammunition, perishable cargo, and post exchange supplies.
• Excessive echelons of stocks. Containerization offers real opportunity for direct delivery support from the supplier in CONUS to the customer in the oversea areas — particularly for high and stable demands like food, ammunition, and packaged petroleum.
Containers cannot be considered just another means of transportation. The full benefits of containerization can only be derived from logistics systems designed with the full use of containers in mind. The logistics systems must provide for the integration of supply, transportation, and documentation with definition of associated automatic data processing system (ADPS) support and management controls. Standing operating procedures must be devised and requirements established for Government-owned or leased containers (for retention in-theater), for special equipment, and for modification of military terminals.
The compelling force behind development or containerization must be the logistics users of containers rather than the transportation operators. Container-oriented logistics support systems can be broken down into two basic subsystems. … Since the Army sponsors two-thirds of the cargo moving overseas by surface means, operates ocean terminals in both the United States and overseas, and must clear cargo from those ports, it has a predominant interest in the land-water-land subsystem. It would be logical therefore to task the Army to lead a jointly staffed effort to develop the land-water-land subsystem of container-oriented logistics. A similar logic indicates that the Air Force should lead a jointly staffed effort in developing the land-air-land subsystem. ...
Reduce and control excesses — While most JLRB recommendations aimed at improved efficiency and effectiveness will serve to reduce excesses in future contingencies, those which will have most significant impact are —
• Regulating the input of cargo to that within a reasonable reception capability.
• Introducing transportable automatic data processing equipment (ADPE) at an early stage for effective supply management.
• Providing prefabricated functional base components that will expedite provision of the ports and warehouses essential to efficient supply operations.
• Minimizing requirements for maintenance in the theater by adopting concepts of modular replacement and revising the philosophy of maintenance “as far forward as practicable.”
• Exploiting containerization.
• Reducing the range and depth of theater stocks. It is noteworthy that five of these recommendations which will help to reduce excesses cover the same actions designed to reduce the requirement for logistics resources in the combat area. …
Establish criteria for common supply overseas — The Board believes the case is clear for common supply in oversea areas for high usage, stable, predictable demand items like food, ammunition, selected construction materials, and bulk and packaged POL.
On the other hand, the Board believes that items used only by one service should normally be supported through service channels from the theater to the single manager inventory control centers in CONUS. Low demand items, even though used by two or more services, should not, in the Board’s opinion, be stocked in the theater either under common supply or otherwise.
The Board knows that there are those who believe that all single manager items should be requisitioned through a single source in the combat theater. The Board urges extreme caution before plunging into the full range of integrated items in such a decision. Applying common supply will tend to complicate in-theater supply channels with few, if any, demonstratable benefits and will serve to counter the Board’s emphasis on simplification and reduction of logistics workload in the combat area. The foregoing is in no way an attack on single manager responsibilities in CONUS. These operations have proved effective and efficient. …
Improve logistics planning — The Board recommendations expand on the current Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) effort to stratify and simplify the planning effort, provide a suggested uniform stratification of war reserves, and suggest a procedure to establish credible “hard core” war reserve requirements.
Assign top-level management early — The Army developed its logistics command structure in Vietnam on a piecemeal basis and from the bottom up — responding to problems rather than providing the executive leadership capable of anticipating problems. A top-level logistician with broad experience in the support of large-scale operations should have been assigned to the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam staff in the early planning phase and should have been onsite at the beginning of the buildup. He should have had sufficient rank and nucleus staff to insure authoritative and competent control over support operations until the situation stabilized.
ln brief, logistics operations deserve the best possible management and continuity from the outset and preferably before the beginning of a major contingency …
Balance force structure — When contingency operations are undertaken without the call-up of Reserves, serious deficiencies may be expected. Alternatives, to include insuring an adequate training and rotational base, must be developed to enhance our capability to respond promptly to limited wars without mobilization.
Balance transport capability — An adequate transportation capability balanced between sealift and airlift is essential to deployment and support of forces overseas ... Such a capability is dependent on a modernized Military Sealift Command nucleus fleet backed by access to the resources of an equally modern U.S. Merchant Marine … The services must be prepared for increased capability in air transport. Airlift has already proven its value for movement of high-value, critically needed items. With the increased capability of the C-5, it will become even more valuable if properly utilized to reduce the requirement for in-theater logistics resources …
Coordinate foreign assistance — It is clear that U.S. foreign assistance activities require coordination with military operations at the interdepartmental level during planning for and execution of military contingency operations. During the planning process, it is especially important to define clearly the responsibilities for and the relationships between military and civilian activities …
Clarify POL responsibilities — Three steps should be taken to clarify POL responsibilities. The Defense Supply Agency’s (DSA) worldwide responsibility for and surveillance over contracts for supply of POL must be made clear and definite. DSA should provide field assistance teams to routinely survey petroleum operations in order to identify potential POL problems and advise on corrective actions.
Finally, there is a need to re-establish the Joint Petroleum Committee under the JCS to insure prompt resolution of interservice problems …
Deploy automatic data processing equipment early — Contingency plan logistics annexes must be explicit as to automatic data processing systems and communications needs and provide for the early deployment of transportable, modular-type equipment into the combat area. ADPS must include proven, fully operational programs and adequately trained personnel.
Speed communications — Communications networks must be designed to take maximum advantage of the worldwide AUTODIN system ...
Procure and produce ammunition — It appeared evident to the JLRB that single service assignments for procurement and production of common and closely related munitions would result in increased efficiency.
The Board recommended that the Army’s mission to produce conventional bombs for the Air Force be transferred to the Navy with appropriate readjustments in facilities and personnel. The Board also recommended study of other munitions to determine possibilities for consolidation of production responsibilities with particular attention to incendiary bombs, projectile fuses, and small arms ammunition …
Coordinate and control construction — A completely new programming and funding procedure is needed to improve responsiveness, flexibility, visibility, and discipline [for wartime construction in a theater of operations] with requirements submitted on a gross basis. A significant contribution to construction flexibility and to reduction in resources are available by exploiting prepackaged and functional component systems.
The JLRB heartily endorses the concept of the Joint Construction Board established a year ago under the JCS. The responsibilities of the Construction Board should, however, be expanded and the Board should be staffed with full-time personnel. This is the one area where the JLRB was not unanimous. A minority of the JLRB withheld their support from a recommendation that these responsibilities include the monitoring of the status of actions taken to improve readiness.
Plan joint logistics responsibilities — Although the basic responsibility for the support and maintenance of forces must remain with the services, unified commands must plan for and be staffed for active involvement, when required, in the multiservice aspects of transportation and movement control, construction, ammunition and petroleum resupply, communications, and control of critical items.
History clearly establishes that logistics resources will seldom satisfy requirements. It is essential then that procedures and movement control organizations be established and in the command which can or needs to control the flow of material into an area of operations at a level commensurate with area through-put capability, lift capabilities. and command requirements. The unified command must also be prepared to establish priorities and otherwise control and direct as necessary whenever there is an unresolved interface between the logistics operations of the services.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Besson’s briefing was based primarily on material contained in volume l of the 2,750-page report. A JLRB spokesman indicated thar distribution of the complete report will be limited — going primarily to agencies with implementing responsibilities. The spokeman said primed copies will be available in the future through regular channels, but could not give an availability date. — TAJ
| Date Taken: | 03.04.2025 |
| Date Posted: | 03.04.2025 13:39 |
| Story ID: | 491999 |
| Location: | US |
| Web Views: | 13 |
| Downloads: | 0 |
This work, The Joint Logistics Review Board Findings, an ALOG Staff Feature, Thomas A. Johnson, Editor, must comply with the restrictions shown on https://www.dvidshub.net/about/copyright.
